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This thesis analyzes the political economy of U.S. 
relations with South Africa between 1968 and 1979- Chapter I 
explores expanding commercial and political ties between the 
two countries within the context of a general understanding 
of the inter-related phenomena of capitalism, imperialism and 
sub-imperialism. It shows that South Africa’s exploitation 
of Southern Africa's peoples and resources is just one aspect 
of the West's imperial domination of the globe. It reveals 
that U.S. support of the apartheid dictatorship constitutes 
but one facet of a strategy in which America and her NATO 
allies cultivate sub-imperial powers such as South Africa, 
Israel and Iran under the Shah in order to sustain and 
strengthen worldwide capitalism. 
Chapter II examines the current nature of American 
trade with and investment in South Africa, including the mili¬ 
tary ramifications of these links. The United States supplies 
the apartheid state with manufactured products, capital, mana¬ 
gerial skills and technological know-how in exchange for: 
vital minerals such as gold, platinum and vanadium; high 
returns on investments; and the opportunity to use South 
Africa as a base for penetrating neighboring African countries 
Chapter III traces the evolution of U.S. governmental 
policies towards the apartheid land from Nixon to Carter. On 
the plane of rhetoric, Nixon's open support of the South 
African regime contrasts with Carter's verbal criticism of 
the regime and his call for majority rule. But on the plane 
of substantive policy, both emerge as staunch defenders of 
broadening American corporate bonds with the settler colony, 
as guardians of international capital in the region. 
Unlike Nixon, Carter claims that U.S. corporations in 
South Africa can improve the lot of the enslaved masses. In 
reality, as Chapters II and III demonstrate, those firms have 
bolstered the entire structure of fascist oppression, strength 
ening the army and police forces while helping the apartheid 
regime to move closer to its goal of energy self-sufficiency. 
Carter's so-called "human rights" policy has been 
exposed as a fraud by his tacit approval of mushrooming commer 
cial relations between the United States and South Africa, his 
refusal to call for a substantive economic boycott, and his 
failure to advance any timetable or specific blueprint for 
progressive change in South Africa. 
In researching this thesis the author drew upon a wide 
range of scholarly books and essays, government publications, 
United Nations documents and anti-apartheid literature. 
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FOREWORD 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who have taught 
me to cultivate knowledge that endures, and to the freedom 
fighters of Southern Africa, who are striving to lift the 




CAPITALISM, IMPERIALISM AND SUB-IMPERIALISM 
The traditionally strong ties between the United 
States and South Africa are quite predictable, given their 
similarities in origin, evolution, economic mode of organiza¬ 
tion and ideological outlook. Despite key differences, both 
are essentially outgrowths of European nationalism, capitalism 
and expansionism. Neither could have evolved into their 
present forms without the subjugation of their lands' original, 
non-white inhabitants. The ruling classes of both are 
Christian, Caucasian beneficiaries of the worldwide European 
hegemony over the human and material resources of the globe. 
Both are fiercely anti-Communist. Both play pivotal roles in 
the global capitalist system. 
America is the most powerful industrial nation in the 
world, the center of gravity of the capitalist network and 
the self-appointed protector of "Free World” private enter¬ 
prise and democratic liberalism. South Africa is the most 
industrialized nation on the African continent; the supplier 
of vital minerals to the West; the locus of billions of 
dollars of investments by Britain, the United States, West 
Germany, France and Japan; and a sub-imperial power with 
strong economic, political and military links to the NATO 
1 
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countries. While the United States is the chief hoarder of 
wealth on a worldwide scale, South Africa is the chief 
hoarder of wealth on the African continent. In order to 
appreciate the relationship between the United States and 
South Africa, one has to understand the manner in which the 
evolving capitalist system has divided wealth on a global 
scale. 
The evolution of capitalism, the African slave trade, 
European colonialism and imperialism have resulted in the 
development of a handful of affluent, industrialized nations 
at the expense and the underdevelopment of the vast majority 
of nations which have remained primarily suppliers of agricul¬ 
tural commodities, minerals and other raw materials. Today 
elites in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, South 
Africa, Canada and a few other lands preside over a lopsided 
division of world wealth in which the rich states wax fat 
from unequal terms of trade, and a near monopoly on (1) capital 
for global investment and (2) advanced formas of technology. 
The impoverished nations have found themselves locked into a 
cycle of dependency in which they must accept the prices set 
for their raw materials by the capitalist market. Most 
African, Asian and Latin American countries are ensnared in 
the webs of a global market economy, centered in the United 
States, which rigs prices in its own favor, setting high 
prices for the finished goods and services it sells to the 
Third World while depressing the prices of agricultural 
products and minerals it purchases from the Third World. As 
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Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has observed: "We in the 
poor countries have to sell more and more sisal, cotton or 
copper to get the foreign exchange needed to import identical 
machines in successive years. 
Sartaj Aziz strikes the same chord in his description 
of one of the chief reasons behind the growing gap between 
the "have" nations and the "have not" nations: 
The most important impact of the existing international 
system is in the gradual erosion of the real value of 
the goods and services produced by the developing coun¬ 
tries. In the past 30 years, the developed nations, 
with direct or indirect control of an unduly large pro¬ 
portion of world resources, have enjoyed unprecedented 
prosperity and have been able to generate a large surplus 
for further technological development. The cost of devel¬ 
oping this technology has been paid by all users, but its 
"scarcity rent" has been retained by the advanced nations. 
The monopoly organization of technology is matched by 
almost perfect competition in commodities and this is in 
turn reflected in a constant deterioration in the terms 
of trade for developing countries. Despite reduction in 
production costs as a result of improvements in organiza¬ 
tion and technology, the prices paid by developing coun¬ 
tries for manufactured goods have been rising in relation 
to those received by them for primary products. The 
workings of the international monetary and financial 
systems gives the developed countries an additional edge 
in international relations. Taking all these factors 
together there is a continuous and unmistakable bias in 
the present system in favour of industrial nations.2 
That bias is dramatically illustrated by the fact that 
the inhabitants of the Asian and African countries of the 
Third World have a per capita income which is only one-tenth 
^"Nyerere, "Destroying World Poverty," Southern Africa, 
September, 1977. p. **■. 
2 
Sartaj Aziz, "The Search for Common Ground," in Partners 
in Tomorrow: Strategies for a New International Order, ed. 
Anthony Dolman and Jan van Ettinger (New"York: E.P. Dutton, 
1978), pp. 12-13. 
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that of the inhabitants of the advanced capitalist countries, 
3 
while that of Latin Americans comes to about one-fifth. 
Even though the rise of socialist regimes in Russia, 
China and Cuba has dramatically changed world politics, 
lending weight to successful liberation movements in different 
parts of the world (including Southern Africa) and somewhat 
reducing the realm of capitalist control, scholars such as 
Silviu Brucan have perceptively noted that: 
the core of capitalism has survived the great revolu¬ 
tionary sweep in the aftermath of World Wars I and II 
[and] has transmitted its own functioning principles and 
[behavior] patterns to the relations among nations. [We 
live in a world] where the socialist countries lag behind 
the advanced capitalist métropoles with regard to all 
major economic indicators, accounting for only 10% to 11% 
of world trade and an even lower share of international 
investments, while the share of the capitalist industrial 
nations in world exports increased from 66% in 1950 to 
76% in 1970.4 
The richest capitalist countries (e.g. the United 
States, Britain, West Germany, France and Japan) constitute 
the nucleus of a system that sucks in wealth from every corner 
of the globe. These same nations, especially Britain and the 
United States, are South Africa's principal trading partners 
and diplomatic supporters. Paul Sweezy has aptly described 
the world capitalist system and South Africa's rank within it 
in terms of the center-periphery metaphor: 
The transition from the center to the periphery is not 
clear-cut or abrupt but rather takes the form of concen¬ 
tric rings which merge into each other. At the center of 
-^Pierre Jalee, The lHiird World in World Economy (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, I969), pp. ^--6. 
^Silviu Brucan, The Dialectic of World Politics (New York: 
The Free Press, 1978), p. 55* 
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the center is the hegemonic power--in the present histor¬ 
ical phase the United States of America--with the greatest 
concentration of wealth and military power. Around it are 
grouped the secondary imperialist powers—Germany, Japan, 
Britain, France [and] Holland. Next come the less power¬ 
ful developed capitalist countries--the Scandinavian coun¬ 
tries, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Canada, Australia. Beyond this is where the 
periphery begins. The inner ring of the periphery consists 
of what may be called regional sub-imperialist countries-- 
Mexico, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, [and] 
Iran [under the Shah], And finally there are the outer 
rings of the periphery comprising the great majority of 
underdeveloped Third World countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. All these taken together make up a coherent 
whole, with lines of authority and subordination running 
from the center of the center clear out to the edges of the 
periphery. Generally speaking there is a reverse flow of 
money and its counterpart, real wealth, from the outer 
edges of the periphery through the intermediate rings to 
the center and finally the center of the center. The whole 
constitutes... a system of exploitation of weaker by 
stronger at every stage of the transition from center to 
periphery and from bottom to top.^ 
The United States, with its trillion-dollar-a-year 
economy, vast industrial complex, and huge array of nuclear 
weapons, is the "center of the center" and the world's chief 
imperialist power. Imperialism is herein defined as "that 
relationship in which one country dominates, through use of 
economic and military power the land, labor, resources, finances 
and politics of another country.Based on that definition, 
Parenti concludes that: 
the Unitjd States is the greatest imperialist power in 
history. The American empire is of a magnitude never 
^Paul Sweezy, "On The New Global Disorder," Monthly Review 
(April, 1979): 2. 
^Michael Parenti, Democracy For The Few, 2d ed. (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1977)i P- 95. 
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before equaled. More than 1.5 million American military- 
personnel are stationed in 119 countries. The United 
States maintains 429 major military bases and 2,972 lesser 
bases in 30 countries covering some 4,000 square miles 
and costing almost $5 billion a year. The military has 
some 8,500 strategic nuclear weapons and 22,000 tactical 
ones deployed throughout the world. The U.S. Navy deploys 
a fleet larger in total tonnage than all the other navies 
of the world combined, consisting of missile cruisers, 
nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers and spy 
ships which sail every ocean and make port on every conti¬ 
nent. Two million native troops and large contingents of 
native police, under the command of military juntas, have 
been trained, equipped and financed by the United States 
and assisted by U.S. counterinsurgency forces, their 
purpose being not to defend these countries from outside 
invasion but to protect capital investments and the 
ruling oligarchs from the dangers of domestic insurgency.^ 
Especially since World War II the American empire's 
foreign policy has been committed to military, commercial and 
political expansionism. Harry Magdoff has identified two 
major currents in the policy of the post-war era: 
(1) A drive to maintain as much of this globe as possible 
free for private trade and private enterprise. Sub¬ 
sumed under this are (a) the prevention of competi¬ 
tive empires from acquiring privileged trading and 
investment preserves to the disadvantage of U.S. 
business interests, and (b) wherever feasible, the 
attainment of a preferred trading and investment posi¬ 
tion for U.S. business. 
(2) The promotion of counter-revolution [through] (a) abor¬ 
tion of incipient social revolutions, (b) suppression 
of social revolutions in progress and (c) counter 
revolution against established socialist societies-- 
through war, economic pressures, or corruption of 
leaders and nations in the socialist fold.g 
The pursuit of such objectives has led the United 
States to assume the role of oppressor of the masses and 
^Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
^Harry Magdoff, Imperialism; From The Colonial Age To The 
Present (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), pp. 214-215. 
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supporter of corrupt dictatorships in diverse parts of the 
world. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. spent more than ten years 
and $150 billion prosecuting a senseless war which left 
millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians dead or 
maimed. In North Africa in the 1950s America supplied money 
and equipment to French colonialists to help them wage an 
unsuccessful, bloody campaign against the Algerian people. 
In the 1960s and the 19?0s the United States repeated the 
same pattern by aiding Portuguese colonialists in Angola, 
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. 
As the primary promoter of counter-revolution, the 
U.S. was also involved in assassinating Patrice Lumumba of 
the Congo and in overthrowing Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1965) 
and Salvador Allende of Chile (1973)-^ Nkrumah posed a 
special threat because he fiercely advocated the political 
and economic unification of the African continent into a 
single state with a socialist ideology, a centralized military 
command and a non-aligned foreign policy. 
The triumph in the mid 70s of armed revolutionaries 
in Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique who are committed to 
building socialist societies represented a significant setback 
for U.S. foreign policy in Africa just as the defeat of 
o yFor details of U.S. involvement in the demise of both 
Lumumba and Nkrumah, see James Dingeman, "Covert Operations 
in Central and Southern Africa," Chapter 5 of U.S. Military 
Involvement in Southern Africa, ed. Western Massachusetts 
Association of Concerned African Scholars (Eoston: South End 
Press, 1978), pp. 93-98. For an expose of the U.S. role in 
Chile see Elizabeth Farnsworth, "Chile: What Was the U.S. 
Role?" Foreign Policy (Fall, 197*0: 127-141. 
8 
500,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam constituted a humiliating 
defeat for U.S. imperialism in the Far East. Although full 
scale revolutionary warfare has not yet erupted in South 
Africa itself, America's fraternal bonds with the settler 
colonists there have placed it once again on the side of the 
oppressors. 
Sub-Imperialism 
One of the key gambits which U.S. governmental and 
business elites have chosen to facilitate their imperial 
strategy has been the cultivation of sub-imperial powers 
which fulfill the role of stabilizing entire regions of the 
Earth so that American capitalism in particular and global 
capitalism in general can maximize control over resources in 
those areas. Rukudzo Murapa observed in 1977 that: 
the U.S. has identified certain strategically located 
countries around the world as being critical to its 
survival and continued world domination. Further, it has 
sought to equip these countries, protect them and give 
them certain policing responsibilities in their respec¬ 
tive regions. These countries, for the most part, are 
economically above the average Third World country and 
have acquired a degree of capital accumulation that 
allows them to purchase extraordinarily large quantities 
of arms and they have become highly militarized. Their 
very close relationship to international finance capital 
has contributed immeasurably to the attainment of their 
unique qualities. The principal countries used in the 
implementation of this strategy are Indonesia, Iran, 
Israel, Brazil and South Africa. 
South Africa's stature as a sub-imperial power grows 
Murapa, "A Global Perspective of the Political Economy 
of U.S. Policy Towards Southern Africa," Journal of Southern 
African Affairs, II (#1, 1977): 79. 
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out of its political, economic and strategic significance to 
not only the United States but to the entire Western world. 
It now produces (or expropriates from its colony, Namibia) 
70 per cent of the world's gold production, 50 per cent of 
the globe’s gem diamonds, 16 per cent of the Western world's 
uranium production as well as sizable quantities of iron ore, 
vanadium, platinum, chrome, titanium and nickel. Table 1 
summarizes South Africa's massive mineral resources and their 
diverse uses in the capitalist system. 
TABLE 1 
SOUTH AFRICAN MINERALS* 
Mineral South African Production & Reserves Uses 
Gold South Africa produces more than 70% 
of the globe's gold and possesses 






Diamonds Fifty per cent of the world's gem 
diamonds are mined in South Africa 
and Namibia. South Africa controls 




Platinum South Africa is the largest producer 






Chrome South Africa's production is second 
only to that of Russia. South 




Asbestos South Africa is the only source of 
crocidolite asbestos and amosite 
asbestos. It has 16% of Western 













TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Mineral South African Production & Reserves Uses 
Fluorspar South Africa has the world's largest 




Ferrochrome South Africa now accounts for 12.5$ 
of total v/orld production. 
Stainless 
steel 
Titanium South Africa has huge deposits. Manufacture 
of aircraft 
engines 




Nickel South Africa holds the largest 
African deposits and now ranks sixth 
in world reserves. 
Steel 
production 
Copper South Africa runs one of the most 






Manganese South Africa is the second largest 
producer after Russia and exports 




Iron Ore South Africa has huge high-quality 







^Source: L.H. Gann and Peter Duigan, South Africa: War, 
Revolution, or Peace? (Stanford, California: Hoover Institu¬ 
tion Press, 1978), pp. 15-16. 
According to Gann and Duigan, the rise to power in 
South Africa of a regime hostile to the West would constitute 
a nightmare of gigantic proportions for several reasons. As 
they hypothesize: 
A left-wing government in South Africa might, of course, 
in its own economic interest, continue to sell raw mate¬ 
rials and to furnish maritime facilities to members of 
NATO, but such a prospect would be problematical. The 
West hardly wants to rely on the fleeting goodwill of a 
government allied with the Soviet Union, which is itself 
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committed to the overthrow of Western democratic govern¬ 
ments.^ 
In their view the new government might use its control of the 
strategic Cape of Good Hope to pressure the West. Western 
dependence on the Cape has increased sharply in recent years: 
The Cape is particularly important to oil tankers, 
whose former route to and from the Mediterranean took 
them through the Suez Canal. Most of these ships are now 
too large to go through the Canal, so more than half of 
Europe’s oil supplies--and a quarter of its food--passes 
around the Cape....Moreover, the increasing dependence of 
the United States on imported Middle Eastern oil has 
further increased the American stake in the Cape route... 
by the 1980's, according to some estimates, 60% of U.S. 
oil imports may have to be supplied via the Cape.^ 
The authors summarize the perceived threat to the West 
by noting that: 
The loss to the Western world of Southern Africa's min¬ 
erals, port facilities, and similar resources would be 
serious enough in itself; but were these riches to be 
added to the Soviet sphere, the USSR would obtain a stag¬ 
gering addition to its economic power....The Soviet Union 
and South Africa are major sources of several vital min¬ 
erals. Together they produce more than 90% of the world's 
platinum, 60% of the world's gem diamonds, 40$ of its 
industrial diamonds, about 80% of the world's gold, and 
sizable percentages of global supplies of asbestos, ura¬ 
nium, fluorspar, and other metals. Soviet control over 
the Cape route would also enable the Kremlin to pressure 
NATO states by a Soviet threat to hamper or interrupt 
maritime traffic.^ 
Yet, the above line of reasoning is far from water-tight. The 
analysts glibly assume that a future black regime would of 
L.H. Gann and Peter Duigan, South Africa: War, Revolu¬ 
tion, or Peace? (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1978), p. 14. 
12Ibid. , p. 11. 
13Ibid. , p. 58. 
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necessity be a Soviet lackey; it could in fact choose to 
pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, maintaining peaceful 
relations with both the East and the 1/Vest. Moreover, Soviet 
interruption of vital Western trade routes would most cer¬ 
tainly be considered an act of war and could lead to harsh 
counter measures, perhaps even nuclear conflagration in 
which the Russians would lose everything. 
Indeed, it may be contended that the close alliance 
between the West and the South African dictatorship and the 
capitalist bloc's disregard of the rights of the African 
majority are forcing the South African liberation movement 
to move closer and closer to the Soviets, who, along with 
other socialist powers, were the chief suppliers of arms and 
aid to successful revolutionaries in Angola and Mozambique. 
Continued Western treatment of the Caucasian settler colony 
as a sub-imperial ally will certainly alienate the future 
black rulers of South Africa. Nevertheless, Gann and Duigan 
conclude that their interpretations justify broader U.S. 
cooperation with the apartheid regime, including the joint 
development of commercial ports and military bases. As they 
put its 
There is no need to support radical liberation movements 
in South Africa; the United States should work through 
the country's moderates, not its militants. 
A missile capable of striking the United States from a 
submarine operating in the Indian Ocean has not yet been 
developed, but it is technically feasible. U.S. planners 
would be better able to counteract these and similar 
threats if they had access to South African harbors and 
to the vast complex of South African airfields and indus¬ 
trial and repair facilities....bases in South Africa 
13 
would supply the United States with permanent facilities 
from which American ships and aircraft could operate. 
Ships and crews would not have to he shuttled from the 
United States or from Europe to the Indian Ocean, and 
from Atlantic to Indian Ocean ports, if South Africa's 
ample supply and repair facilities were made available... 
The U.S. strategic position in the Indian Ocean and the 
South Atlantic would be strengthened.... The United States 
could rely on an extensive industrial and military infra¬ 
structure and on substantial local forces.^ 
In addition to the implications of its strategic loca¬ 
tion and mineral resources for the global capitalist network, 
there are other facets of South African sub-imperialism. 
These concern its fraternal relationships with other sub¬ 
imperial nations and its domineering position on the African 
continent itself. 
Sub-imperial powers maintain close ties not just with 
the chief imperialist state but also with other sub-imperial 
lands. Thus, prior to the downfall of the Shah's regime, 
Iran supplied "both Israel and South Africa with large percent¬ 
ages of their oil needs. Iran has also trans-shipped American 
arms to South Africa as Israel and Brazil have."1-’ For more 
than a decade the illegal minority regime in Rhodesia was 
able to resist the tide of armed struggle waged by African 
guerrillas primarily "because of the constant flow of weapons, 
supplies and even manpower from the regional imperialist sub¬ 
center in South Africa.Key sectors of Zimbabwe’s economy 
^Ibid., pp. 14, 59. 
1%urapa, op. cit. , p. 83. 
16 
p. 8. 
U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit., 
14 
are owned outright by South African firms and transnational 
corporations. 
Israel, South Africa and Zimbabwe prior to its liber¬ 
ation all fit the description of classic settler colonies 
where minorities of Europeans oppress the indigenous non-white 
populations with a view towards maximizing the gains of the 
settlers as well as those of international capitalists. Simi¬ 
larities among the three were exposed and denounced by the 
vast majority of Third World nations in a 1975 United Nations 
General Assembly resolution which classified Zionism as 
racism and stressed that: 
The racist regimes in occupied Palestine and racist 
regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperi¬ 
alist origin, forming a whole...and being organically 
linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity 
and integrity of the human being.^ 
THE SEIDMAN FRAME-WORK 
The conceptual framework set forth by Ann and Neva 
Seidman in their seminal study, South Africa and U.S. Multi¬ 
national Corporations, is essential for a thorough understand¬ 
ing of South African sub-imperialism. They delineate a model 
which shows how the development of South Africa has "fostered 
and shaped underdevelopment throughout the entire Southern 
African region" while also exposing "the relationships between 
18 
South Africa and the more developed nations of the West." 
^'Malik S. Hakim, "Israel and South Africa Intensify 
Unholy Alliance," Bilalian News, May ?, 197&* P* 40. 
"1 R 
South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations 
(Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1978), pp. 6-7. 
15 
The authors note that most African countries, like the Third 
World in general, are: 
only- marginally incorporated into the world commercial 
system through export enclaves geared to production of 
raw materials for shipment to developed country factories 
to contribute to higher living standards there. Entire 
regions have been shaped, historically, into extensive 
reserves of cheap labor for the foreign-owned mines and 
plantations, and in some areas, African owned cash crop 
farms, which produce low cost raw materials for export. 
Almost all manufactured goods, especially capital goods 
for the raw materials-producing sectors and luxury items 
for the few who can afford them, have been imported. 
Pre-existing handicraft industries have been stunted or 
destroyed by colonial restriction and the import of mass 
produced goods. The bulk of the investible surpluses pro¬ 
duced has been and continues to be shipped out of the 
country in the form of profits, interest and high salaries 
for the management of the foreign firms, trading companies 
and associated financial institutions which dominate the 
export enclave. Little has been left for investment in 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors to produce goods 
to meet the needs of the masses of the population. The 
entire political economy of the typical African economy 
has been shaped to be externally dependent on the sale of 
raw materials, the importation of manufactured goods, and 
the expertise and capital supplied by foreign firms which 
control the production and trade and siphon out the sur¬ 
pluses produced.^ 
In sharp contrast to the impoverished, largely agricul¬ 
tural economies of most African nations, South Africa boasts 
the most industrialized economy and a high standard of living 
which place it closer to the developed capitalist world than 
to the Third World. With the backing of its major trading 
partners and investors (e.g. Britain, the U.S., West Germany, 
Japan, France and Italy) white South Africa has been able to 
drain incalculable wealth from the land and subject peoples 
under its formal political jurisdiction as well as from 
19 Ibid . , pp. 7-8. 
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surrounding areas. Much of this wealth has been used to 
erect an advanced industrial foundation. As a result: 
Manufacturing is the most important sector in the South 
African economy, contributing almost a fourth of the 
Gross Domestic Product. In the rest of Africa and Asia, 
in contrast, manufacturing characteristically accounts 
for less than 15$ of GDP^Q 
The massive sucking of wealth into South Africa and 
the nearly total monopolization of that value by Caucasian 
settlers has led to a situation in which white South Africans 
now control a staggeringly disproportionate share of all of 
Africa's resources, including: 
22$ of Africa's total goods and services, 42$ of the 
continent's autos, 35$ of its trucks, 48$ of Africa's 
farm tractors, 45$ of the continent's telephones, 32$ of 
Africa's cement, 71$ of its wool, 87$ of its steel, 93$ 
of its newsprint and 95$ of its gold.^ 
South Africa is the only African country with "a major iron 
and steel industry and with petrochemical and advanced engi- 
22 
neering plants." Militarily, South Africa dwarfs all other 
African countries in terms of both elementary and advanced 
weapons systems and all but Nigeria and Egypt in terms of the 
number of well equipped combat troops (265,000 counting its 
reserves) that it can mobilize on short notice. Due to 
decades of close military and economic cooperation with the 
West, the settler colony has been moving ever closer to its 
20 
Seidmans, op. cit., p. 16. 
21 
Valentine Belfiglio, "United States Economic Relations 
with the Republic of South Africa," Africa Today (April-June, 
1978): 67. 
22 Gann and Duigan, op. cit., p. 25. 
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goals of self-sufficiency in arms production and the posses¬ 
sion of nuclear weaponry. By 1977 the list of weapons which 
it could produce by itself included "missiles, motorized 
equipment like the Ratel infantry combat vehicle, small arms, 
23 
maritime assault vessels, naval frigates and ordnance." J
From the United States South Africa has acquired 
dozens of Lockheed Starfighter bombers, Patton battle tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, anti-submarine patrol boats and 
hundreds of machine guns. From Britain have come dozens of 
Centurion heavy tanks, hundreds of armored personnel carriers 
and an unspecified number of helicopters. From France the 
racist dictatorship has purchased dozens of Mirage III jet 
24 
fighters and Puma assault helicopters. In September, 1979 
the South African government apparently detonated its first 
nuclear bomb.23 
The basis of South Africa's development has been and 
continues to be its vast mineral resources, foreign investment 
(including $6 billion in direct investments by Britain and 
2 6 
$2 billion by the United States) and "the vast reservoir of 
low-cost labour provided by the systematic impoverishment of 
23Ibid., p. 26. 
24 
^YCbid., pp. 28-29. 
23"U.S. Detects Signs of Nuclear Explosion in Ocean Near 
South Africa," New York Times, October 26, 1979» PP» A-l, A-10 
26 
For British figure, see A. Nagorski, "U.S. Options vis 
a vis South Africa," in Africa and the United States; Vital 
Interests, ed. Jennifer Whitaker (New”Yorks New York Univer¬ 
sity Press, I978), p. 191. For U.S. figure, see Karen Rothmyer 
"New Dollars For South Africa," Southern Africa, September, 
1979, P. 17. 
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27 African populations" inside and outside its borders. Preced¬ 
ing and subsequent portions of this chapter make it clear 
that Sweezy is amply justified in characterizing South Africa 
as : 
both a less powerful developed capitalist country and a 
regional sub-imperialist country. In some ways it can 
even be looked upon as an empire in and of itself--an 
advanced capitalist white economy holding onto and 
seeking to expand its own periphery in the black states 
of southern Africa.gg 
Indeed, white South Africa’s domination of people and 
resources throughout the Southern African complex is just one 
facet of the overall domination of the vast majority of 
non-white peoples throughout the world by the Caucasian West. 
South Africa's Internal Oppression 
Under the apartheid system, only South Africa’s 
4.5 million Caucasians have the right to cast ballots, occupy 
political office and own the major means of production. 
Beneath the whites are 2.5 million Coloreds, most of whom 
inhabit the Cape region and one million Indians settled 
primarily around Durban in the Natal region. According to a 
new constitution scheduled to go into effect in May, I98O, 
these two ethnic groups will have respective mini-parliaments 
of their own, with limited leeway to effect changes in their 
ov.n communities, but no power to affect the overall political 
27 'Seidmans, op. cit., p. 9* 
28 Sweezy, op. cit., p. 2. 
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2Q 
economy. The economic-political noose around the necks of 
Indians and Coloreds generaHy permits them only slightly more 
leeway (e.g. the freedom to operate certain small enterprises) 
than that experienced by the African masses. At the bottom of 
the society are 25 million blacks, the most impoverished, 
powerless and oppressed of the non-white groups.-^® 
Today the whites who comprise less than 15 per cent of 
the nation's population enjoy tremendous affluence, while the 
black masses who comprise 76 per cent of the population and 
70 per cent of the work force subsist in poverty and degradation. 
South African whites consume more than 60% of the total 
national income, have legal occupancy rights to 87% of the 
land, and fill most of its skilled and semi-skilled occupa¬ 
tions . ^ 
The most dangerous, filthy and lowest paying jobs are reserved 
for blacks. No matter how poor any Caucasian is, he or she 
hires an African servant on a permanent basis. The government 
has outlawed diverse African liberation organizations since the 
early 1960s and, utilizing draconian statutes such as the 
Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act, has banned, 
32 
jailed, tortured or murdered numerous African leaders. 
29 
'Steven Strasser, "Cracks in Apartheid," Newsweek, 
October 29, 1979» pp. 46-47. 
^°For population figures, see Georges Suffert, "Change in 
South Africa," Atlas, May, 1979» p. 35- 
•^Bernard Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class 
in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979) PP- 1-2. 
32Ibid., pp. 303-307. 312-313» 316-324. The author cites 
many examples of governmental repression of activists such as 
Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Steve 3iko. 
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South Africa's racial-class hierarchy is chillingly 
reflected in statistics on infant mortality and wages for 
the country's different racial groupings. 
It is estimated that the mortality rate among black South 
Africans is five times that for whites and three times 
that for Asians. Estimates range from 200 to 450 black 
infant deaths per 1,000 live births.^ 
African wages in the construction and manufacturing sectors 
are only 20 per cent of Caucasian wages. Colored workers earn 
about 25 per cent of white wages in the mining sector; the 
figures for the construction and manufacturing realms are 
34 38 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. 
Africans outnumber Caucasians in all major urban areas 
of South Africa, including: Johannesburg, Capetown, East Rand, 
Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Witwatersrand.33 And 
blacks make up sizable percentages of the work force in every 
key sector of the economy. In mining and quarrying, they 
account for 88.8 per cent of total employees; in construction, 
72.8 per cent; in manufacturing, 56.2 per cent; in metal produc 
tion, 64.4 per cent; in textiles, 64.4 per cent; in the food 
industry, 64 per cent; in plastics, 56.4 per cent; in chemicals 
51.8 per cent; in transport equipment, 46 per cent; and in 
furniture production, 45*7 per cent.3^ 
Despite the fact that millions of black workers are 
33Ibid. , p. 2 . 
34 J Seidmans, op. cit., p. 21. 
33Magubane, op. cit., p. 151. 
36Ibid., pp. 152-155. 
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indispensable to the everyday functioning of the metropolitan 
complexes and the economy as a whole, the ruling elite is 
determined not to grant the masses of blacks any permanent 
rights of residence or other leverage in the principal urban 
centers or anywhere else inside that 87 per cent of the land 
which has been set aside for white South Africans. Under the 
"separate development" strategy being implemented by the racist 
regime, blacks possess citizenship rights only in the nine 
underdeveloped, impoverished bantustan-reservations or tribal 
"homelands" which together comprise that 13 per cent of the 
land which is least endowed with mineral and agricultural 
wealth. Only in these balkanized enclaves do blacks have the 
37 right to vote, hold office and own property. 1 
To date, three of the so-called "homelands"--the 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda--have been granted a fake 
independence which no nation (except Rhodesia under Smith) has 
recognized. All the bantustans are over-crowded, devoid of 
industries, lacking in basic infrastructures, and financially 
dependent on South Africa. Venda, for example, which received 
"autonomy" in September, 19791 has to rely on the apartheid 
state for 60 per cent of its food needs and for more than 
-^For an excellent overall treatment of the bantustan 
strategy see Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's 
Bantustans (London: International Defence & Aid Fund, 1976). 
For a theoretical approach to the same subject see Martin 
Legassick and Harold Wolpe, "The Bantustans and Capital Accu¬ 
mulation in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy 
(September-December, 1976): 87-IO7. Another probing study, by 
Legassick and David Hemson, is Foreign Investment and the 
Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa (London: 
Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1976). 
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three-quarters of its first annual budget.-^® South Africa's 
military forces, not Yenda’s citizens, will remain in total 
control of newly built airbase in the territory. And since 
there are few jobs on the reservation, "an estimated 67% of 
the male work force has to go looking for jobs as foreign 
blacks in white areas."^7 
In essence, the major purpose of all the bantustans 
is to provide cheap labor reserves for Caucasian South Africa. 
The homelands, observes Bernard Magubane, like the entire 
superstructure of apartheid (e.g. pass laws, fluctuating labor 
legislation and various anti-Communist statutes) have been 
designed to maximize the surplus value extracted from the 
African working class while minimizing the chances of this 
pivotal class rising up in an organized fashion against 
centuries of barbaric treatment. 
Africans [have been] remorselessly channeled to the 
mines, farms and factories as need dictated. After their 
labor power is chewed up [they are] spit out into the 
reserves. 
The great advantage of the reserves is that not only can 
Africans be reproduced cheaply there, but they can also 
be used as a dumping ground for the human waste discarded 
by the urban and mining industries. As a result, a 
"perfect" number of African laborers can be maintained in 
the so-called white areas, while the African areas are 
kept in a state of social and economic dependence.^ 
-^Andrew Marx, "Venda Independences Pressing on with the 
Bantustans," Southern Africa, October, 1979» pp. 9-10. 
-^Ibid. , p. 10. 
^°Magubane, op. cit., pp. l4l, 86. 
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South Africa's External Dominion 
South Africa has traditionally exploited the physical 
resources and the labor of the black masses throughout South¬ 
ern Africa. 
[Its] mining and agricultural concerns have long depended 
upon neighboring countries as a critical reserve of low 
cost wage labour essential to reaping the accumulation of 
profits which have been a major source of finance for 
South Africa's industrial growth. The total number of 
workers migrating to South Africa annually in recent 
years has been estimated at almost 600,000.^ 
The largest numbers have traditionally come from Malawi, 
Mozambique and Lesotho, with lesser numbers coming from Bot¬ 
swana, Swaziland and Zambia. South Africa's landlocked neigh- 
bors--Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho-~are all 
heavily dependent on the apartheid giant's railways, harbors 
and ports. 
One facet of South Africa's development at the expense 
of black-ruled states (both inside and outside Southern Africa) 
can be seen in its pattern of trade with them. This pattern 
parallels the overall pattern of trade between the developed 
capitalist world and the underdeveloped lands, that is, it 
revolves around unequal exchange. Although exact figures are 
almost impossible to obtain, the New York Times estimates that 
the apartheid land is now pressing a "semi-secret $1 billion 
_ 42 
[per] year trade with perhaps 25 black-governed nations." 
41 
Seidmans, op. cit., p. 138. 
42 
John Burns, "Pretoria Is Pressing Secret Trade With 
Black Africa," New York Times, April 18, 1979» sect. 1, p. 18. 
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Most of South Africa's exports to its Western capi¬ 
talist trading partners are raw materials (largely minerals 
such as gold, platinum and chrome); most of its imports from 
these nations are manufactured goods. In contrast, South 
Africa’s exports to the rest of Africa consist primarily of 
manufactured products, including: 
machinery and equipment (in 197^» 73^ of the total export 
of these items went to black [ruled] Africa); chemicals 
(55%)i plastics and rubber products (89^)5 stone, cement 
and glass products (77%) and transport machinery and 
equipment (73%). Most South African imports from the 
rest of Africa consist of light consumer goods and raw 
materials; vegetable products, prepared foodstuffs, bev¬ 
erages and tobacco; textiles and mineral products.^ 
Namibia: South Africa's Colony 
The League of Nations granted South Africa a mandate 
over Namibia after World War I. After World War II the Inter¬ 
national Court of Justice declared the apartheid state's 
dominion over the territory to be illegal. But for years 
South Africa has contemptuously ignored this ruling as well 
as subsequent U.N. and O.A.U. (Organization of African Unity) 
resolutions condemning its rulership. South African firms 
such as DeBeers have joined hands with American mining corpo¬ 
rations such as Tsumeb Corporation to exploit Namibia's vast 
mineral resources which include uranium, lead, zinc, diamonds 
and copper. In typical colonial fashion, Namibia supplies 
43 
-'Seidmans, op. cit., p. 159» 
44 Ibid., pp. 162-172. 
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raw materials to South Africa while being dependent on the 
latter for almost all manufactured imports. 
The guerrilla struggle waged by the Southwest African 
People's Organization (SWAPO) and mounting U.N. pressure have 
forced South Africa to acknowledge that it must one day relin¬ 
quish its rule in Namibia, but apartheid rulers seem bent on 
holding onto certain key areas. In September, 1977 the dicta¬ 
torship: 
incorporated Walvis Bay, Namibia's only commercial and 
fishing port into [its] Cape Province, declaring that it 
will remain South African even after independence. Walvis 
Bay adjoins the richest uranium fields in Southwest Africa. 
All U.N. and O.A.U. resolutions relating to Namibian 
independence refer to it as an integral part of the Nami¬ 
bian territory. South Africa's uranium comes mainly from 
the huge Rossing mine, the territory which starts just 
east of Walvis Bay.^ 
In recent years South Africa has kept as many as 50.000 troops 
stationed in Namibia and has repeatedly used that country as 
a base for launching invasions into neighboring Angola. 
South Africa's Captives 
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho have been labelled South 
Africa's captives because, despite the fact that they achieved 
nominal political independence from Britain in the 1960s, they 
have largely remained in the apartheid land's economic orbit. 
Swaziland and Lesotho are tiny enclaves totally surrounded by 
South African territory. Botswana is flanked on the west and 
south by Namibia and South Africa. The low level of growth 
^^Wilfred Burchett 
Urizen Books, 1979). P* 
Southern Africa Stands Up (New York: 
203: 
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fostered by British colonialism, together with in-depth 
penetration by British, South African and other foreign capi¬ 
tal, have left all three states economically unviable. Their ' 
lack of industries and infrastructure has forced thousands of 
their nationals to migrate regularly to South Africa for jobs. 
As the Seidmans note: 
Their basic industries are predominantly owned by South 
African or interlinked, especially U.S. owned firms, and 
are geared to export. The major commercial banks which 
handle their financial transactions are Barclays and 
Standard. The handful of wholesale trading houses which 
import manufactured goods are almost wholly owned by South 
Africans.^ 
South African and other transnational corporations reap the 
lion's share of profits from Swaziland's iron ore; Botswana's 
diamonds, nickel and copper; and Lesotho's diamonds. Per 
capita wages handed to African laborers in all three nations 
are below those received by black South Africans. 
Zimbabwe 
Historically, many of Zimbabwe's Caucasian settlers were 
migrants from the older, larger and more developed South 
African settler colony and even today many firms in Zimbabwe 
are merely subsidiaries of South African corporations. When 
the United Nations declared economic sanctions against Ian 
Smith’s rebel regime after his Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in 1965» it was primarily South Africa's massive 
economic and military support which allowed the illegitimate 
government to stay afloat for more than a decade until guerilla 
46 1 
Seidmans, op. cit., p. 174. 
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warfare brought about its collapse. Following U.D.I., South 
Africa rushed troops and para-military personnel into the 
country; by 1974, these were "calculated to equal, and pos- 
• 47 sibly outnumber, the Rhodesian forces under arms." 1 South 
Africa has long been the major conduit for both Rhodesian 
imports and exports. The South African government and Mobil 
Oil played the leading roles in supplying the beleaguered 
regime with oil. 
Even during the period of transition to majority rule, 
South African troops remained in Zimbabwe, threatening to 
destabilize the country if the March, 1980 elections resulted 
48 in a government perceived as hostile by the Pretoria regime. 
The triumph of the pro-socialist, Patriotic Front leader 
Robert Mugabe constituted a setback for South Africa, which 
had supported the pro-capitalist candidate Bishop Abel Muzo- 
rewa. Although South African troops appear to have left the 
country following the elections, there is no guarantee that 
they will not return, especially if Zimbabwe becomes a base 
for freedom fighters committed to toppling the apartheid 
dictatorship. 
The multinational corporations have not departed the 
country. Prominent among these are many American firms, for 
^Ruth First, "Political and Social Problems of Develop¬ 
ment," in Africa South of the Sahara, 8th ed. (London: Europa 
Publications, 1978), p. 28. 
48 
"Zimbabwe After Lancaster House: What Next?" (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: Washington Office On Africa, 1980), p. 3- 
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"almost all of the U.3. corporations in South Africa have 
subsidiaries in Zimbabwe. Union Carbide, Foote Minerals, and 
American Metal Climax are there as are IT&T and IBM..." ^ 
Economists estimate that U.S., British and South African firms 
own, in roughly equal shares, 9° per cent of Zimbabwean mining 
interests (e.g. copper, nickel, chrome, coal, asbestos, gold 
and lithium) while Britain and South Africa control about 
80 per cent of all the country's manufacturing concerns.'’0 
Whether and to what extent the recent attainment of political 
independence in Zimbabwe will alter this pattern of foreign 
exploitation, by re-harnessing the nation's wealth for the 
benefit of the impoverished masses, remains to be seen. 
Mozambique 
Prior to Mozambique's independence in 1975» South Africa 
exploited the country through its close association with the 
Portuguese colonial government. 
Mozambique...long provided one of the most important sources 
of cheap labor for South African mines. About 86,000 Mozam¬ 
bicans, driven by poverty and systematic Portuguese recruit¬ 
ment, worked annually in South Africa. A quarter of their 
annual earnings of $60 million were paid directly to the 
Portuguese government in gold.^ 
These revenues helped to finance the colonial administration 
and, when armed struggle erupted in 1964, aided the Portuguese 
^Malik S. Hakim, "The Real Stakes in Zimbabwe," Bilalian 
News, February 18, 1977» p. 27. 
5°Ibid. 
^Data on Mozambique in this section derive from Seidmans, 
op. cit., pp. 194-197. 
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in prosecuting what turned out to be an unsuccessful campaign 
against the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FR2LLM0). 
As in Zimbabwe, the escalation of the war for liberation was 
accompanied by an expansion of South African involvement in 
the economy. South African exports to Mozambique multiplied 
five times between 1969 and 1973. 
The Anglo-American Corporation channeled sizable 
investments into banking, the cashew industry and the mining 
sector. By 1969 it had invested close to $30 million in 
Mozambique. South African firms headed an international 
consortium (also including French, British and West German 
corporations) in xhe financing and construction of the massive 
Cabora Bassa Dam, which is the second largest hydro-electric 
generating station on the continent. This project furnished 
a significant market for South African manufactured goods. 
The dam complex was designed to be the center of irrigation 
schemes, industrial developments and road and railway networks. 
The colonial authorities hoped that it would help attract a 
million new Portuguese settlers to the country. 
The collapse of Portuguese rule and the installation 
of the FRELIMO government in 1975» however, doomed the settle¬ 
ment scheme and cast a shadow over South African ambitions in 
Mozambique. The new government has nationalized banks, 
decreased the number of migrant laborers going to South Africa 
and insisted on improved wages and working conditions for them. 
FRELIMO made it quite clear that, over time, it planned to 
build a socialist political economy. If it successfully 
30 
consolidated its ties with Tanzania and perhaps Zambia 
along these lines, this would lay the basis for a major 
structural transformation threatening South African [and 
other] multinational corporate interests throughout the 
Southern region.^ 
However, half a millenium of Portuguese rule left 
Mozambique extremely underdeveloped, with little infrastruc¬ 
ture, few factories, and hardly any skilled technicians and 
professionals. The nation can utilize only a tiny percentage 
of the electricity generated by Cabora Bassa and since the 
heavy power lines run to South Africa, the FRELIMO government 
has had to sell almost all of the dam's energy to South Africa. 
The fact that Mozambique still has to rely on South African 
personnel and technology to operate its railway system and 
its principal port, Maputo, testifies to the apartheid regime’s 
enduring sub-imperial influence. 
52 Ibid., p. 19?. 
CHAPTER II 
SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This chapter examines current U.S. trade and invest¬ 
ment stakes in South Africa and shows how the American 
corporate presence has strengthened the Caucasian-dominated 
settler colony in the development of such vital areas as the 
exploitation of strategic minerals, manufacturing, nuclear 
technology and oil production. 
For decades U.S. commercial ties with South Africa 
overshadowed ties with the rest of Africa. Not until 197? 
did the latter overtake South Africa in terms of U.S. exports 
and investment. In that year: 
[American] net exports totaled $2.2 billion to black 
[ruled] Africa and $1.05 billion to South Africa. Direct 
U.S. investments in black [ruled] Africa were $1.8 billion 
compared with $1.7 billion in South Africa.^ 
In 1973 the United States imported $2.2 billion in goods and 
services from South Africa, but more than $8 billion from the 
rest of Africa. The bulk of American imports from the 
latter come from Nigeria, which is now the second largest 
^Herman Nickel, "A Sharper Focus for U.S. Policy in 
Africa," Fortune, August 14, 1978, p. 134. 
^William Cotter, "The Neglected Continent," Africa 




supplier of oil to the United States. Together with Libya, 
Angola and Algeria, the West African state accounts for "one 
third of all U.S. imported oil."^^ American investment in 
black-ruled Africa is concentrated in Nigeria, Zaire, Libya, 
Liberia, Gabon and Angola. Table 2 summarizes U.S. imports 
from and exports to South Africa between 1968 and 1978. Trade 
between the two has steadily mounted over the years. Only in 
TABLE 2 









1969 $243.0 million $505.5 million +$262 - 5 million 
1970 $290.2 million $562.7 million +$272.5 million 
1971. $286.5 million $622.4 million +$335.9 million . 
1972 $324.7 million $602.5 million +$287.8 million 
1973 $376.9 million $746.4 million +$369.5 million 
1974 $608.8 million $1.159 billion +$551.1 million 
1975 $840.9 million $1.302 billion +$461.5 million 
1976 $924.8 million $1.348 billion +$422.8 million 
1977 $1.269 billion $1.054 billion -$214.4 million 
1978 $2.200 billion $1.070 billion -$1.130 billion 
♦Sources for import figures for 1968-1977: Surveys of 
Current Business (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
December, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978), pp. S22-S23. 
Import figures for 1973: Foreign Economic Trends and Their 
Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, May, 1979), p. 3- Sources for export 
figures for 1966-1977: Surveys of Current Business (December, 
19^0, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978), pp. S21-S22. Export 
figure for 1978: Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications 
for the United States, op. cit., p. 3- 
55Ibid. 
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the last two years of the period under study did the United 
States register a trade deficit with South Africa. That 
deficit amounted to $214.4 million in 1977 and $1.13 billion 
in 1978. 
South African imports from the United States consist 
mainly of vehicles, aircraft, machinery, electrical equipment, 
mechanical appliances, chemical products, paper products and 
rice. On the other hand, U.3. imports from South Africa 
consist primarily of diamonds, platinum, ferro-manganese and 
ferro-alloys."^ Although American trade with South Africa 
is small in purely monetary terms when contrasted to U.S. 
commerce with major trading partners such as Canada, Japan, 
Britain and West Germany, South African minerals are far more 
crucial to the United States than dollar figures summarizing 
the trade would indicate. Several of these minerals are 
absolutely essential to the smooth functioning of the U.S, 
military-industrial complex. 
South Africa supplies the United States with about 
cn 
40 per cent of its chromium imports. ' This metal is indispen¬ 
sable in the production of high-temperature, corrosion-free 
alloys required in jet engines and power plants. The only other 
major source of chrome besides South Africa and Zimbabwe is the 
Soviet Union, which embargoed shipments to the U.S. during 
"^Valentine Belfiglio, op. cit., p. 63. 
cn 
-"Unless otherwise indicated, data on all minerals come 
from Sandy Feustel, "African Minerals and American Foreign 
Policy," Africa Report (September-October, 1978): 12-17. 
3^ 
the Korean ://ar and which has sometimes doubled the price of 
its chrome exports. A contingency plan prepared by the 
Natural Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of 
Science concluded that the United States would be more vulner¬ 
able to a long-term chromium embargo than to the embargo of 
most other natural resources. 
Thirty-three per cent of American platinum imports now 
come from South Africa. The platinum group provides essential 
catalytic converters in the petroleum and chemical industries 
and is also used in telephone and telegraph instruments, relays, 
and aircraft magnetos. Fifty-six per cent of America’s vanadium 
imports originate in the apartheid land. Vanadium is a key 
catalyst in the manufacturing of iron and steel alloys. South 
Africa also furnishes sizable percentages of other vital min¬ 
erals imported by the U.S., including antimony (44 per cent) 
which is used in the production of lead, glass, ceramics and 
plastics; ferro-manganese (32 per cent) which is essential for 
making stainless steel; asbestos (j6 per cent) which is utilized 
in the production of insulation materials, textiles and air¬ 
planes; and uranium (15 per cent) which is used in nuclear 
reactors and weapons. 
Soutn Africa is a prime source of gold for the United 
States, although it is difficult to determine the exact 
percentage which comes from the apartheid land. According to 
Ann Seidman, much of the gold which Switzerland sells to the 
58 Ibid., p. 13. 
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U.S. actually originates in South Africa.^ Gordon Bertolin 
notes that: 
The United States depends on imports for k5c/° of its gold. 
Patterns of trade are difficult to evaluate because of 
the movement of newly mined gold through Zurich and London 
and because of monetary movements between central banks. 
Since about two-thirds of world gold production is in 
South Africa, that country is clearly a major source of 
gold for the United States.gg 
South Africa contains half of the world's estimated gold 
reserves. Despite trends towards the de-monetization of gold, 
"forty per cent of all non-communist country reserves are 
still held in gold."^ Gold is a key element in the world 
banking system and since, as Wallerstein has noted, "this 
system rests on a shaky political base, tampering with South 
African stability would have an impact horrendous to contem- 
62 
plate." American policy makers are no doubt concerned about 
the maintenance in South Africa of a regime which facilitates 
the flow of gold into the international economy on terms 
favorable to the West. Sales of South Africa's Kruggerand 
gold coins (which in 1978 earned the apartheid state nearly 
$1 billion in foreign exchange) are booming in the United 
States. In that year alone Americans purchased more than 
CO 
-^Letter from Seidman to the author, November 28th, 1979. 
^°Bertolin, "U.S. Economic Interests in Africa," in 
Africa and the United States: Vital Interests, op. cit., p. 45. 
^Feustel, op. cit., p. 14. 
62 
Immanuel Wallerstein, "American Foreign Policy in 
Africa After Vietnam," in After Vietnam: The Future of American 
Foreign Policy, ed. Robert Gregg et. aî^ (New York: Doubleday, 
1971), P. 199. 
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three million of these coins, more than half of all Krug- 
gerands marketed abroad.^ 
As much as the U.S. depends on South Africa for 
crucial metals and minerals, a study commissioned by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and done by Charles Rivers Associates 
concluded that the United States could find alternative 
sources for some of these raw materials. The study, which 
was released in December, 1976, concluded that a revolt in 
South Africa; 
[could] lead to short-term disruptions of supplies only, 
together with a brief period of higher prices, but that 
long-term supply flows from other sources would be easy 
enough to procure without the U.S. having to pay signifi¬ 
cantly more for them. James C. Burrows, who headed the 
study team--which surveyed the outlook for chromium, 
manganese, platinum and cobalt--added that the U.S. wasn't 
"vulnerable" at all and that "there has been too much of 
a crisis atmosphere in discussions about these commodi¬ 
ties."^ 
The above quote is of special interest in the context of this 
thesis because it reveals a weakness in any argument which 
rationalizes continued U.S. support of the apartheid regime 
on the basis of the "indispensability" of South African 
minerals. It also makes less excusable the American govern¬ 
ment's refusal to enact substantive economic sanctions against 
the racist settler colony. 
-^"U.S.-South Africa Investment Issue," Africa News, 
Durham, North Carolina, February 9, 1979» P- 11• See also 
"1978 Kruggerands Put At $1.2 Billion," Africa Report (March- 
April, 1979): 23. 
Cited in R.W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa 
Survive? (New York; Oxford University Press, 1977)» P* 318. 
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U.S. Investment In South Africa 
Turning to the corporate investment picture, we see 
in Table 3 that direct U.S. investments in South Africa have 
risen sharply from $692 million in 1968 to about $2 billion 
in 1979* Some 539 American firms now have branches in the 
TABLE 3 
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (1968-1979)* 
Year Investment 
1968  $ 692 million 
1969  $ 834 million 
1970  $ 864 million 
1971  $ 9^4 million 
1972 $ 900 million 
1973  $1.24 billion 
1974  $1.46 billion 
1975 $1.57 billion 
1976  $1.60 billion 
1977  $1.70 billion 
1978  $1.80 billion 
1979  $2.00 billion 
*Source for 1968, 1970, 1972, 1973 and 1974s Seidmans, 
op. cit., pp. 79-80. Source for 1969s U.S. Congress, House, 
U.S, Business Involvement in Southern Africa: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Washington, D.C.s UTS. Government Printing Office, 1973)» 
p. 609. Source for 1971s Bruce Oudes, "The United States' 
Year in Africa," in Africa Contemporary Record, ed. Colin 
Legum (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1973)* P« A-77» 
Source for 1975s Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern 
Africa," in U.S, Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. 
cit., p. 43. Source for 197^s Hunt Davis. Jr., "U.S. Policy 
Toward South Africa," in American Policy in Southern Africa, 
ed. Rene Lemarchand (Washington, D.C.: University Press of 
America, 1978), p. 290. Source for 1977s Foreign Economic 
Trends, May, 1979» op. cit., p. 3- Source for 1978 and 1979s 
Karen Rothmyer, "New Dollars for South Africa," Southern 
Africa, September, 1979» P* 17* 
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apartheid state.^ These and other U.3. corporations also hold 
an unknown amount of indirect investments there which are often 
channelled through European businesses. Direct American invest¬ 
ments currently account for 20 per cent of all the foreign 
long-term direct investments in South Africa.^ These invest¬ 
ments are concentrated in sectors crucial to the maintenance of 
the apartheid military-industrial nexus and the ongoing oppres¬ 
sion of 25 million black subjects. About 50 per cent of American 
corporate investment is in manufacturing, 20 per cent in petro¬ 
leum, 10 per cent in mining and smelting, and 20 per cent in 
other areas.^ Today U.S. firms in South Africa control a 
staggering 70 per cent of the computer market, 49 per cent of 
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the petroleum market and 23 per cent of the automobile market. 
Together with the British firm Shell-BP, Mobil and Caltex funnel 
South Africa most of its oil. 
In dollar values American investments in the apartheid 
manufacturing sector are about five times greater than those 
in the mining sector. Although less than 2 per cent of all 
U.S. overseas investment is in the apartheid land, South Africa 
now ranks fourteenth among all nations in the world in terms of 
^Investment in Apartheid (New York: United Nations Centre 
Against Apartheid, June, 1978), p. 1. 
^Seidmans, op. cit. , p. 75* 
^Hunt Davis, Jr., "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," in 
American Policy in Southern Africa: the Stakes and the Stance, 
ed. Rene Lemarchand (Washington, Û.C.: University Press of 
America, 1978), p. 291. 
68 
Shelly Pitterman and David Markun, "Campaigning For 
Divestment," Africa Report (September-0ctober, 1978): 18. 
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6Q 
U.S. investment in manufacturing. 7 About four out of every 
five dollars invested by Americans in manufacturing on the 
70 African continent are in the settler colony. 
The rate of return on American investments in South 
Africa is incredibly high; in 1973 it stood at 20 per cent."'7'*' 
Until the recession of the mid-1970s, U.S. companies in 
South Africa were earning at least twice as much for 
every dollar invested--and often far more--as they were 
in the world as a whole. Sven now South Africa compares 
favorably with the rest of the world in this regard.^ 
What makes such profits realizable are fascist economic and 
political controls, a hard and convertible currency (the Rand) 
and the presence of a vast pool of dirt cheap, powerless black 
labor. 
In 1972 the lion's share of American profits was 
reaped by just thirteen corporations, which in that year 
supplied more than three-quarters of all the U.S. capital in 
South Africa.^ These firms ares General Motors, Caltex 
(jointly owned by Texaco and Standard Oil), Ford, Mobil, IT&T, 
General Electric, Chrysler, Firestone, Goodyear, 3M, IBM, 
Union Carbide and Caterpillar. The "Big 13" also play a 
pivotal role in the U.S. economy; together they own about 
69 7
Seidmans, op. cit., p. 95- 
7
°Ibid. , p. 96. 
71 
' Pitterrnan and Markun, op. cit., p. 19* 
^^Karen Rothmyer and TerriAnn Lowenthal, "The Sullivan 
Principles: A Critical Look At The U.S. Corporate Role In 
South Africa," (New Yorks The Africa Fund, 1979)1 P- 2. 
73 
'-'Seidmans, op. cit., p. 78. 
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25 per cent of the total assets of all American industrial 
74 corporations. Hence, they are in an excellent position to 
deeply influence not only American foreign policy towards 
South Africa, but U.S. policy in general. As the Seidmans 
observe : 
These giant U.S. multinationals are closely inter¬ 
twined with each other, as well as with most of the 
other U.S. companies which have invested in South Africa, 
through their boards of directors and banking ties. Most 
are grouped around the Rockefeller or Morgan interests. 
These firms have, furthermore, sufficient contacts in 
high U.S. governmental circles to exercise significant 
influence in shaping official policy towards South 
Africa.^ 
The holdings of some of the current largest U.S. firms 
in South Africa, as computed by economist Jennifer Davis of 
the American Committee On Africa, are set forth in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
MAJOR U.S. INVESTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY* 
Corporation Investment 
Mobil $1.3 billion 
Caltex $225 million plus 
General Motors $150 million 
Kennecott $130 million 
General Electric $125 million plus 
Ford $100 million plus 
Union Carbide $100 million plus 
Phelps-Dodge $100 million plus 
IT&T $ 50 million to $70 million 
Chrysler $ 45 million 
^Source: "U.S. Dollars In South Africa! Context And 




Working hand in hand with these and other U.S. firms 
in the apartheid state are U.S. banking leviathans, which 
have periodically bailed out South Africa during acute finan¬ 
cial crises such as the ones which followed the Sharpeville 
massacre in i960 and the Soweto rebellion in 1976. "About 
one-third of all loan claims against South Africa, or some 
$2.8 billion, are held by U.S. banks, primarily Citibank, 
n ^ 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, and Bank of America."' 
We will now examine in more detail how American corpo¬ 
rations have bolstered the South African economy and govern¬ 
ment in key sectors, including police and military prepared- 
77 ness. In conjunction with their South African counterparts, 
U.S. firms have also used the apartheid land as a base for 
exploiting the entire Southern African region. 
Mining 
American and British interests currently control 
nearly half the shares of Anglo-American Corporation, the 
largest of the seven huge mining finance houses that dominate 
the South African economy. In 1974 the Anglo group, with 
more than $7*4 billion in assets, produced 23 per cent of 
South Africa's coal and 25 per cent of its uranium. 
^Pitterman and Markun, op. cit., p. 20. See also "Bank 
Loans to South Africa," Southern Africa, September, 1979> p.24. 
"^Unless otherwise indicated, data in the remainder of 
this chapter derive from Seidmans, South Africa and U.S. Multi¬ 
national Corporations, op. cit., Part III and Seidmans, Activi¬ 
ties of Transnational Corporations in South Africa (New York: 
United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, May, 1978), passim. 
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The U.S. firm most closely involved in apartheid 
mining is the Englehard Minerals & Chemicals Corporation, the 
globe's biggest refiner of precious metals. The late Charles 
Englehard (d. 1971), who directed the company's fortunes for 
many years, was a good friend of Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, lobbied fiercely for the expansion of U.S.-South 
African ties and heaped praise on the policies of Prime 
Minister Vorster. When the international community's reaction 
to the Sharpeville massacre threatened South Africa with a 
capital outflow, he personally arranged a $35 million loan to 
shore up the dictatorship. Englehard also served on the 
boards of two "native recruiting" agencies which brought 
Africans from Zimbabwe and Mozambique to work for slave wages 
in South African mines. 
American Metal Climax (AMAX) has exploited minerals 
in several Southern African nations, often in partnership 
with Anglo-American. During one period prior to Zambia's 
independence, AMAX owned about half of that country's copper 
mines. AMAX and Anglo now have a joint investment in the 
chief copper-nickel mines in Botswana. Together with Newmont, 
smother U.S. mining conglomerate, AMAX holds a majority of the 
shares in the Tsumeb copper mines in Namibia. Newmont also 
produces iron, copper, magnetite and vermiculite. 
Union Carbide produces 20 per cent of South Africa’s 
chrome and owns a major chrome mine in Zimbabwe (formerly 
Rhodesia). One of its presidents, Kenneth Rush, served as 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of State 
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during the Nixon-Ford years and was instrumental in getting 
Congress to pass the Byrd Amendment, which from 1971 to 1977 
allowed the United States to import Rhodesian chrome in 
violation of U.N. sanctions. 
Atomic Technology 
The United States and other NATO countries (notably 
West Germany) have provided South Africa with nuclear tech¬ 
nology for decades. American involvement in this area dates 
back to 1952 when the apartheid land's first uranium plant 
began operation under a tripartite agreement between South 
Africa, Britain and the United States. In those days the U.S. 
and Britain were the only purchasers of South African uranium. 
In the early 1960s South Africa bought its first nuclear 
reactor, Safari I, from the United States. It was installed 
with the assistance of the American firm Allis Chalmers. The 
U.S. also trained South African nuclear scientists at the 
Atomic Energy Commission laboratories at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 
In 1974 the U.S. Nuclear Corporation exported 45 kilo¬ 
grams of enriched uranium to a South African research reactor. 
The U.S. continued supplying processed uranium to South Africa 
in 1975 and 1976 and promised to sell more to a nuclear power 
plant to be constructed in the apartheid state by a French- 
American consortium by 1984. The South African government has 
consistently refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty. As 
we noted in Chapter I, there were indications that South Africa 
exploded a nuclear device in September, 1979- 
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Manufacturing 
American manufacturing corporations, along with trans¬ 
national firms based in other countries, have helped South 
Africa to erect the largest and most diversified industrial 
base in Africa. The primary reasons why the settler colony 
has been a magnet for such firms are these: (1) its 4.5 million, 
high-income Caucasian minority comprises a significant market 
for manufactured products, and (2) the depressed wages of black 
workers and low tax rate granted to the corporations by the 
government guarantee soaring profits. As mentioned earlier, 
about 80 per cent of all U.S. investment in manufacturing on 
the continent is concentrated in South Africa. 
By 1971 U.S. Steel Corporation had set up four subsidi¬ 
aries in the apartheid land, producing diverse metals such as 
ferro-manganese, ferro-chrome, copper and zinc. These metals, 
in turn, are used in manufacturing a wide range of goods such 
as basic industrial parts for trains, rolling mills, motor 
vehicles, blast furnaces, and electrical equipment. In 1975 
the mammoth firm bought a 19 per cent interest in Associated 
Manganese Mines of South Africa, a major manganese ore producer 
which also owns high grade iron ore reserves. U.S. Steel 
contracted to purchase more than three million tons of this 
ore annually for 15 years, from 1978 to 1993* 
Motor Vehicles 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler control close to a 
third of the South African motor vehicle market. Together 
45 
their investments total about $300 million or 15 per cent of 
all U.S. investment in the settler colony. They compete with 
each other for government contracts to sell cars and trucks 
to the police and the armed forces. These include troop trans¬ 
port trucks, such as GM's Bedford trucks, police vans, and 
four-wheel-drive vehicles of the kind utilized on army patrols. 
In 1971 GM's South African sales totalled 35»700 vehicles. 
It marketed all its locomotive output and a sizable percentage 
of its truck output to the South African government. Ford's 
spokesmen have admitted that between 1973 and 1977 "it sold 
128 cars and 683 trucks directly to the South African Ministry 
of Defense, and 646 cars and 1,473 trucks to the South African 
police. 
In 1978 Ford and GM were paying their African workers 
an average salary of only $59 per week and $53 per week respec¬ 
tively. No average was available for Chrysler, but investiga¬ 
tors learned that it was paying its lowest-level African 
employees under $30 per week.^9 in 1967 Chrysler established 
a new plant on the edge of the Tswana bantustan in order to 
take advantage of this large reservoir of unskilled, indigent 
laborers. 
There is no doubt that in the event of war or severe 
internal rebellion the U.S. motor plants would take on added 
military significance. A secret GM memorandum, written in 1977 
^®Karen Rothmyer, "Apartheid Rides On U.S. Wheels," 
Southern Africa, March, 1979» P* 22. 
^Mike Shuster, "Sullivan Principles Produce Few Changes 
On Factory Floors," Southern Africa, March, 1979» P* 22. 
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and released by the American Committee On Africa in 1978, 
acknowledged that General Motors has agreed to cooperate fully 
with the fascist apartheid government if widespread black 
uprisings occur. The memo noted that: 
Should the emergency situation escalate nationally, it is 
fair to assume that the Government would declare the 
country to be virtually in a state of war. This in effect 
would place the industry at the disposal of national 
authorities and it is almost certain that National Key 
Point industries would be taken over by an arm of the 
Ministry of Defence which would regulate output and coordi¬ 
nate the entire industrial effort.QQ 
Electrical Equipment 
General Electric, which began operating in South Africa 
in I898, is the largest electrical firm in the settler colony. 
It manufactures and sells a broad range of household appli¬ 
ances, industrial controls, locomotives and capacitors. The 
firm produced control relays for the massive Cabora Bassa Dam 
in Mozambique when that land was under Portuguese colonial 
rule and when the dam was seen as contributing to the consoli¬ 
dation of Caucasian, capitalist dominion throughout Southern 
Africa. G.E. was one of a handful of companies chosen by the 
South African government to manufacture television sets and 
equipment. It also produces railroad locomotives for the 
government and turbine generators for the South African Elec¬ 
tricity Supply Commission. 
International Telephone & Telegraph (IT&T) turns out a 
wide spectrum of electrical equipment in its five major South 
80 
Jennifer Davis, "General Motors in South Africa: Secret 
Contingency Plans," (New York: The Africa Fund, 1978), p. 3* 
^7 
African subsidiaries. It has sold communications equipment to 
the police and recruited engineers for key positions at the 
Simonstown Naval Base. Sperry Rand sells aerospace, communi¬ 
cations and farm equipment to South African buyers. Although 
the exact range of items it produces in the apartheid state is 
unknown, in the United States it produces flight systems for 
the Air Force, including altitude reference systems, gyroscopic 
systems and computers. It probably supplies some or all of 
these items to the South African dictatorship. 
Oil 
Oil is the only indispensable natural resource which 
South Africa does not possess within its own geography. It is 
essential for industry, agriculture, transportation, and police 
and military operations. Without this precious fluid, South 
Africa's military-industrial complex would grind to a halt. 
Broad cooperation with American, British and West German corpo¬ 
rations has enabled South Africa to reduce its dependence on 
oil to a level lower than that enjoyed by any other developed 
country. Oil currently provides for only "about a fifth of 
O-i 
the country's domestic energy needs." The apartheid state 
now imports about 90 per cent of its oil supplies. The rest 
is produced by a costly oil-from-coal process operated by the 
State Oil Corporation (SASOL) with help from transnational 
firms. 
O-i 
■‘‘Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, "Oil Sanctions Against 
South Africa," (New Yorks United Nations Centre Against Apart¬ 
heid, June, 1978), p. 13. 
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Without support from these firms and Western govern¬ 
ments, which have refused to institute an oil embargo against 
the settler regime, South Africa could not survive. In 1973 
all OPEC countries except Iran enacted oil sanctions against 
South Africa because of its apartheid policies and fraternal 
links with Israel. Iran subsequently became "South Africa's 
chief supplier, providing more than 90 per cent of the country's 
Op 
imported oil." After the Shah's downfall, the Khomaini gov¬ 
ernment cut off oil to the settler colony. 
South Africa responded by introducing a massive oil conser¬ 
vation and education campaign aimed at cutting consumption 
by 20 per cent, while at the same time being forced to pay 
top dollar for whatever oil it could get through legal or 
illegal means. It may also have drawn on oil stockpiles-- 
estimated at between 18 months and 2 years' supply--which 
it had been building up. But the most important long-term 
action v/hich South Africa took with regard to its oil 
problem v/as to decide on a huge increase in its oil-from- 
coal facilities. 
Under a $4.2 billion contract, Fluor Corporation, a 
U.S. multinational based in California, has since 1975 been 
providing the engineering and supervising the construction on 
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Sasol II, South Africa’s second coal-to-oil plant. Sasol I, 
completed in 1955» has an output of about 4,500 barrels per 
day. Sasol II, to be completed by I98O, will produce 40,000 
barrels per day. During the next few years a planned expansion 
of Sasol II will double production to 80,000 barrels per day. 
Op 
"Fluors Building Energy Self-Sufficiency In South 
Africa," (New York: The Africa Fund, 1979)» P* 2. 
83 Ibid. 
®^Ibid., pp. 3-4. All data on Sasol II derive from these 
pages. 
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By the end of 1982, all the Sasol plants together should be 
producing about 85,000 barrels a day, at least 35 per cent of 
South Africa's projected energy demand. 
While Fluor is helping South Africa to convert its 
huge deposits of coal into oil, three American oil companies-- 
Mobil, Caltex and Esso--are instrumental in procuring and 
refining oil for the settler colony. Caltex now accounts for 
about 20 per cent of the total volume of oil marketed through 
South Africa's retail service stations; the figures for Mobil 
and Esso are about 18 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. 
Together the three corporations control about half of the 
country's petroleum products market. 
Banking 
As noted previously, U.S. banks have extended about 
$2.8 billion in loans to South Africa. The bulk of these are 
held by Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust and the Bank of 
America. Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty and Kidder Peabody 
are among other key lenders. At least 5^ other U.S. banks 
have extended credit to the apartheid land. 
U.S. banking and financial concerns appear to provide the 
key link in the complex network v/hich binds together the 
firms engaged in other sectors. Most of the largest U.S. 
firms with investments in South Africa are represented on 
the boards of the two largest U.S. banks most directly 
involved [Citibank and Chase Manhattan]. 
®-^Bailey and Rivers, op. cit., p. 31 • 
O f. 
°Jennifer Davis, "U.S. Dollars In South Africa," op. 
cit., p. 5• 
®^Seidraans, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corpora— 
tions, op. cit., p. 111. 
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Anti-apartheid activists have succeeded in getting 
U.S. customers to withdraw more than $127 million from banks 
doing business in South Africa, but much more work will, have 
to be done in this area before the largest banks substantively 
88 
change their loan policies towards the settler colony. 
Meanwhile these banks will continue to facilitate the expan¬ 
sion of investment by U.S. firms in diverse areas of the South 
African economy. 
Reviewing the data presented in this chapter, we can 
see that American financial institutions and corporations 
play a broadening and indispensable role in supplying South 
Africa with the capital, manufactured products and managerial 
expertise required to sustain its military-industrial complex 
and to perpetuate its racist, capitalist class structure. In 
return, the U.S. firms receive precious metals, a growing 
market for diverse goods, high profits and the chance to drain 
wealth from the entire Southern African region. We will now 
scrutinize the role of the U.S. government in fostering this 
partnership. 
OO 
Bill Hartung, "Bank Campaign: Planning for the Eighties, 
Southern Africa, September, 1979 • P« 23. 
»» 
CHAPTER III 
U.S. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 
TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA: FROM NIXON TO CARTER 
During the Nixon years U.S. policy became increasingly 
beneficial to the Caucasian regimes in both Pretoria and 
Salisbury. The guiding light of the Nixon policy in Southern 
Africa appeared in the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM) #39. otherwise known as the "Tar Baby" policy because 
it tended to adhere the U.S. to closer commitments to the 
settler regimes. U.S. policy makers chose option #2 of that 
memorandum, the option which bluntly assumed that: 
The whites are here to stay and the only way that construc¬ 
tive change can come about is through them. There is no hope 
for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through 
violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportu¬ 
nities for the Communists. We can by selective relaxation of 
our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modifica¬ 
tion of their current racial and colonial policies, and through 
more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a 
total of about $5 million annually...) help draw the two groups 
together and exert some influence for peaceful change.g^ 
Considering the underdeveloped nature of African econo¬ 
mies, the logic of South Africa's industrial expansion, and 
the strings of dependency characteristically attached to U.S. 
"aid," we can safely assume that what was really implied by 
®^Seidmans, 
tions, op. cit., 




"drawing the two groups together" was the locking of African 
countries into neo-colonial orbits around the dominant econo¬ 
mies of South Africa and its Western mentors. 
NSSM #39 also noted that: 
Southern Africa is geographically important for the U.S. 
and its allies, particularly with the closing of the Sues 
Canal and increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean. 
The U.S. uses overflight and landing facilities for mili¬ 
tary aircraft in South Africa which also possesses major 
ship repair and logistic facilities with a level of tech¬ 
nical competence which cannot be duplicated elsewhere on 
the African continent. 
The memorandum frankly admitted that: 
the current thrust of South African domestic policy does 
not involve any basic change in the racial segregation 
system... There is virtually no evidence that change might 
be forthcoming in these policies as a result of an approach 
on our part.2^ 
In other words, the United States government abandoned the 
black majority to interminable servitude. 
While American policy makers continued to abhor apart¬ 
heid in official policy statements and State Department 
bulletins claimed that the U.S. neither encourages nor dis¬ 
courages investment in South Africa, American investments there 
doubled in the five years after the National Security 
Council outlined U.S. political, economic and strategic 
interests in the country. By 1973f it totalled about 
$1,240 million, about a fifth of all reported foreign 
investment there, second only to that of the British. It 
jumped another 17% to $1,457 million in 1974...^2 
^Mohammed 21-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., The Kissinger 
Study of Southern Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill 
& Co., 1976)» PP* 87-88. 
^Seidmans, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corpora¬ 
tions , op. cit., jT! 747" 
92Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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During the Nixon years U.S. imports from South Africa rose 
from $225.9 million to $608.8 million while American exports 
to the settler colony climbed from $455*7 million to $1.16 bil- 
9 3 lion. ^ The compatibility of corporate objectives and the 
goals of U.S. policy towards South Africa was a constant, 
plainly visible theme of the Nixon era. 
In December, 1969 Nixon's Secretary of Commerce, Maurice 
Stans, recommended the following moves towards South Africa: 
(1) an easing of restrictions on U.S. export promotion activity 
inside South Africa. In Stans' view such restrictions were 
making it harder for the U.S. to keep pace with the competitive 
sales drives of Britain, Canada, Japan and Italy; (2) a broad¬ 
ening of Export-Import Bank services to U.S. exporters to South 
Africa; (3) a weakening of the American arms embargo against 
South Africa; and (4) a lifting of U.S. economic sanctions 
94 against Rhodesia to permit importation of its chrome. 
Nixon and the U.S. Congress subsequently adopted all 
^See Table 2 of this thesis. 
^Bruce Oudes, "The United States’ Year in Africa," in 
Africa Contemporary Record, ed. C. Legum (New York: Africana 
Publishing Co., 1977), p. A-120. See also "State Department 
Sets Out Ex-Im Rules," Southern Africa, September, 1979» PP* 12, 
31. The U.S. Congress created the Export-Import Bank in 1945 
to facilitate the sale of American goods to foreign countries. 
The Bank makes loans to cover foreign purchases of U.S. commodi¬ 
ties. In 1964 it stopped making direct loans to South African 
buyers of American goods. However, from that year until 1978 
it continued insuring such purchases by guaranteeing loans made 
by U.S. banks to South African buyers. In October, 1978 the 
U.S. Congress passed a bill (HR 1.4279) which banned Ex-Im 
credits, insurance and guarantees to the South African govern¬ 
ment and to all South African firms not complying with "fair 
employment" practices. 
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of Stans’ recommendations as well as other pro-apartheid 
measures. The U.S. began selling the South African Defense 
Department more light aircraft which could be used for recon- 
naisance and training purposes, helicopters such as the 
"amphibious Sikorsky 62 that is capable of flying 400 miles 
without refeuling and was used extensively by the U.S. Army 
in Vietnam," and gigantic C-l4l and C-I30 transport planes 
Q C 
which were later used to carry South African troops to Angola. J 
Between 1967 and 1972 the U.S. sold 1,376 aeroplanes of 
various types to South Africa, including ten giant C-I30 
troop carriers. In 1972 NATO secretly requested SACLANT 
(its Supreme Allied Command in the Atlantic) to devise 
plans for the protection of the Cape route--plans which 
necessarily involved Pretoria.^ 
During the Nixon years IBM supplied sophisticated computers to 
the apartheid military forces. In addition, several high 
ranking South Africans such as Minister of Information C.P. 
Mulder and military commanders paid cordial visits to the 
Pentagon. 
In 1970 the United States used its veto in the Security 
Council to defeat a proposal strengthening the condemnation of 
Rhodesia. That same year the American government agreed to 
"allow South Africa to sell its gold to the International Mone¬ 
tary Fund after a suspension of such sales for almost two years. 
This was an economic victory for South Africa, which was 
^George Houser, "U.S. Policy in Southern Africa," in 
U.S. Policy Toward Africa, ed. Frederick Arkhurst (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975)» P. 108. 
96 7 R.W. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
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experiencing serious foreign exchange shortages" at the 
time.^ 
In 1971 the U.S. Congress, at the urging of the Nixon 
Administration, passed the infamous Byrd Amendment, which 
allowed the United States to import Rhodesian chrome in direct 
violation of United Nations' sanctions. This move underscored 
the Administration's pro-minority-rule orientation. As Cox 
has observed: 
While the importation of chrome was a source of foreign 
exchange for the white-minority regime, it was, still 
more importantly, interpreted by the Ian Smith regime as 
an act of U.S. political solidarity.^g 
That year also witnessed the signing by the United 
States of the Azores Agreement with Portugal which resulted in 
the channeling of millions of dollars, defoliants and aircraft 
(including Boeing 707s, 727s and 737s) to the colonial govern¬ 
ments in Angola and Mozambique for use against the expanding 
guerrilla liberation movements in those lands.^ 
During the Nixon administration the total American 
budget for training Portuguese military personnel doubled. 
Significant indications of the trend toward more direct 
support were provided by the tenfold increase in the 
number of Portuguese air force pilots trained by the United 
States in fiscal year 1971-72, as well as the exchange of 
9? 7'The Africa Research Group, Race to Power: the Struggle 
foi» Southern Africa (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1974) » 
p. 292. 
^Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern Africa," in 
U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 42. 
^Allen Isaacman and Jennifer Davis, "U.S. Policy Towards 
Mozambique, 1946-1976: the Defense of Colonialism and Regional 
Stability," in American Policy in Southern Africa, op. cit., 
PP. 30-33- 
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strategie tactical information between American and 
Portuguese commando experts at a conference held in 1972. 
As part of the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt," American corpora¬ 
tions... were encouraged to invest in Mozambique....Among 
the major petroleum firms which engaged in exploratory 
operations were Hunt International, Sunray, Shell...and 
Amoco, while Gulf Oil served as the distributing agent 
for Sonarep--the principal Mozambican processor. At the 
same time, Bethlehem Steel received a mineral concession 
to operate in part of the Tete district. United States 
firms such as Caterpillar Tractor Company and General 
Electric provided construction equipment and power grids, 
respectively, for the strategic Cabora Bassa Dam.^QQ 
In 1972 the U.S. opposed a General Assembly resolution 
affirming the struggle against colonialism and apartheid "by 
all available means. Whereas the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations had often abstained from voting on anti¬ 
apartheid measures in the United Nations, the Nixon Adminis¬ 
tration consistently voted "No" on such resolutions. Simulta¬ 
neously Nixon wholeheartedly endorsed South African Prime 
Minister Vorster’s policy of "detente" with black-ruled African 
states, which focused in particular on Zambia, Malawi, Senegal 
and the Ivory Coast. By bolstering the settler regime's 
economic links with these countries and presenting a facade of 
amiability towards Africa in general, Vorster hoped to undercut 
102 
African and global opposition to his government. 
A key figure in the Nixon Administration who smiled 
upon the detente policy was Kenneth Rush, who left the 
100Ibid. , pp. 33-34. 
^^Houser, op. cit. , p. 92. 
102 
Seidmans, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corpora¬ 
tions , op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
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presidency of Union Carbide in 1969 to become U.S. ambassador 
to Switzerland. His firm has long been a major purchaser and 
processor of chrome on a worldwide basis and has branches in 
both South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). Rush had 
been lobbying for the American importation of Zimbabwean chrome 
and for friendlier ties with the apartheid business elite for 
years before Nixon named him Undersecretary of State in 1972. 
Hence, the passage of the Byrd Amendment was a special feather 
in his cap. 
Another prominent corporate ally in the upper echelons 
of government was David Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa. In April, 1973 he frankly observed that the 
U.S. balance of payments problem, severe foreign competition 
and "problems in our aerospace industry" were prime factors 
contributing to the administration's decision to relax restric¬ 
tions on the sale of civilian and military equipment to South 
Africa.In later testimony before Charles Diggs' subcom¬ 
mittee on Africa, Newsom revealed that governmental permission 
to sell American helicopters to South Africa stemmed directly 
104 
from a request by the Monsanto Corporation. 
A key trend facilitating the thrust of such firms into 
South Africa was the expansion of Export-Import Bank services 
to their clients. "The level of authorization from the Ex-Im 
^Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," in 
Africa Contemporary Record 1973-74, ed. C. Legum (New Yorks 
Africana Publishing Co., 1975)» P- A-42. 
104 Ibid. 
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Bank for loan guarantees and insurance to South Africa quad¬ 
rupled from 1971 to 1975 Table 5 summarizes Ex-Im flows 
to South Africa between 1968 and 1979* 
TABLE 5 
EX-IM INSURANCE & LOAN GUARANTEES TO SOUTH AFRICAN FIRMS* 
(1968-1979) 
Fiscal Year Total 
1968  $ 43.9 million 
1969  $ 21.6 million 
I97O  $ 25.4 million 
1971  $ 42.8 million 
1972  $143.4 million 
1973  $ 80.8 million 
1974  $ 99.7 million 
1975  $162.0 million 
1976  $254.4 million 
1977  $115.5 million 
1978  $ 45.9 million 
1979   none 
♦Source: Statistics supplied by Randolph Swart, economist 
in the Export-Import Bank, during an interview with the author 
in Washington, D.C. on January 11, I98O 
The Ex-Im Bank extended guarantees and insurance to 
South African purchasers of capital goods and equipment in 
diverse fields, including mining, steel manufacturing, trans¬ 
portation and electric power generation. The cumulative Ex-Im 
exposure from 1968 to 1978 amounted to $935«4 million. As 
Table 5 shows, the three peak years, in order, were: 1976 
105 Cox, op. cit., p. 43. 
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($254.4 million), 1975 ($162 million) and 1972 ($143 million). 
The three lowest years from 1968 to 1978 were: 1969 ($21.6 mil¬ 
lion), 1970 ($25.4 million) and 1971 ($42.8 million). No 
flows were registered in 1979- 
While the Ex-Im Bank aided South African buyers of 
capital goods, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture extended credits to South 
African buyers of American farm products, chiefly rice, but 
also in several years, tallow and soy products, and in one 
year, cotton. Table 6 summarizes CCC grants to the settler 
colony in the period under study. 
TABLE 6 
COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GRANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA (I96S-79)* 
Fiscal Year For Rice For Other Goods Total 
1968 — — none 
1969 $ 4.8 million — $ 4.800 million 
1970 $ 9*9 million $146,000 (tallow) $10.046 million 
1971 $ 9*3 million — $ 9-300 million 
1972 $ 9-3 million $342,000 (tallow) $ 9.642 million 
1973 $10.6 million — $10.600 million 
1974 $ 2.5 million — $ 2.500 million 
1975 $11.2 million — $11.200 million 
1976 $19.8 million $ 67,100 (cotton) $19.867 million 
1977 $3*9 million $617,000 (soy) $ 4.517 million 
1978 $ 7-6 million $713.000 (soy) $ 8.313 million 
1979 — — none 
♦Source: Statistics supplied by L.T. McElvain, Chief of 
Programs Operations, Export Division of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, in an interview with the author in Washington, 
D.C. on January 11, 1980. Note: The CCC pays the American 
exporter what is due him from the South African importer, in 
effect buying his account receivable, and obtains a letter of 
credit in favor of the CCC. The CCC is later repaid by the 
South African buyer.  
6o 
The cumulative CCC exposure from 1969 to 1978 amounted 
to $90,785 million. The three peak years were: 1976 ($19*867 
million), 1975 ($11.2 million) and 1973 ($10.6 million). The 
three lowest years between 1969 and 1978 were : 1974 ($2.5 mil¬ 
lion), 1977 ($4,517 million) and 1969 ($4.8 million). No CCC 
flows were registered in 1968 or 1979* Neither officials from 
the Ex-Im Bank or the CCC have revealed the reasons why grants 
to South Africa followed a roller-coaster pattern, rising 
steeply in some years, declining sharply in others; but, as 
we will see later in this chapter, Congressional legislation 
passed late in 1978 has restricted Ex-Im flows to the settler 
colony. 
The Ford Years 
Although the descent of the Watergate spectre on the 
White House led to the demise of Richard Nixon's presidency in 
August, 1974, Gerald Ford continued his same basic policies 
towards South Africa. U.S. commercial ties with the apartheid 
state continued to expand during the Ford years. The two-way 
trade between America and South Africa went from $2.14 billion 
in 1975 to $2.72 billion in 1976.In the same period U.S. 
direct investments in South Africa climbed from $1.57 billion 
to $1.60 billion.10'’ As Tables 5 and 6 illustrate, the Ford 
years also witnessed an upsurge in Ex-Im and CCC flows to the 
settler colony. In FY 1976, for example, Ex-Im flows totalled 
10^See Table II of this thesis. 
^®^See Table III of this thesis. 
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$254.4 million, which exceeded the combined figures for the 
two peak Nixon years. Similarly, CCC grants in FY 1976 were 
$19.867 million, which exceeded by more than $8 million the 
figure for the peak Nixon year. In addition, the Ford Admin¬ 
istration opened a new channel of assistance to the Pretoria 
regime by contributing $84.18 million towards a $366 million 
grant to South Africa by the International. Monetary Fund in 
1976.108 
Other forms of support developed. In the same month 
that Ford assumed office the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
entered into: 
two long-term, fixed commitment enrichment services 
contracts with ESCOM (the South Africa Electricity Supply 
Commission) covering the supply of services to a two- 
reactor nuclear power station 20 miles north of Capetown, 
In 1975 the U.S. Nuclear Corporation of Tennessee "sent 97 
pounds of enriched uranium to South Africa on a contract which 
was approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
At the United Nations, the United States continued to 
back the Caucasian minority regime. In October, 1974 the U.S. 
joined Britain and France in vetoing a resolution in the 
Security Council which would have expelled South Africa from 
the U.N. because of "its continued implementation of apartheid, 
■^^James Morrell and David Gisselquist, "How the IMF 
Slipped $464 Million to South Africa," (Washington, D.C.: 
Center For International Policy, January, 1978), p. 1. 
^^Ronald Walters, "The Nuclear Arming of South Africa," 
Black Scholar (September, 1976): 28. 
110 Ibid., p. 27. 
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its refusal to withdraw from Namibia and its support of the 
illegal regime in Rhodesia.In 1975 those three NATO 
countries again combined forces to veto U.N. proposals "to 
take severe economic measures to compel South Africa to end 
112 its colonial rule over Namibia." 
Had it not been for certain momentous developments in 
Portugal and Southern Africa, the Ford Administration would 
have no doubt remained committed to the Nixonian strategy of 
strengthening commercial and political bonds with the settler 
regimes, ignoring the human rights of the tens of millions of 
Africans who comprised the majority populations in the region, 
and contemptuously assuming that capitalist, Caucasian minority 
rule was "there to stay." But in April, 197^ a group of army 
officers staged a coup in Lisbon, overthrowing the fascist 
regime and pledging themselves to a policy of decolonization 
in Africa. In 1975 Mozambique and Angola achieved political 
independence. In the former, the pro-socialist FRELIMO govern¬ 
ment came to power unhindered by any major rival groupings. 
But in Angola, a fierce civil war ensued between the Soviet/ 
Cuban backed MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola) and two rival movements (FNLA and UNITA), both of 
which received sizable support from the United States and South 
Africa. The head of FNLA, Holden Roberto, had links with the 
^^Burchett, op. cit., page xix of the Introduction. 
112 
Seidmans, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corpora¬ 
tions , op. cit., p. 1. 
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CIA stretching back to 1961; the "Committee of Forty" supplied 
him with hundreds of thousands of dollars to fight MPLA. 
UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, had maintained close ties with 
111 
Portuguese colonialists at least since 1972. While war 
raged in Angola, the guerrilla movement in Zimbabwe was 
operating successfully over increasingly larger sections of 
the countryside. 
As they watched the buffer zones around South Africa 
crumble, Ford and Kissinger had to relinquish some of the 
illusions inherent in the "Tar Baby" policy. They shifted 
gears on their approach to Southern African affairs. The 
Ford Administration covertly channeled millions of dollars of 
aid to MPLA’s foes in an unsuccessful, last-ditch bid to 
prevent the triumph of the socialist liberation movement in 
Ilk 
Angola. Assisted by Cuban troops, MPLA vanquished FNLA, 
UNITA and the South African troops that invaded Angola. In 
December, 1975 the U.S. Senate, under pressure from anti-war 
activists and African governments, voted to prohibit further 
American aid to anti-MPLA forces "despite urgent pleas by 
President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. 
Having failed to protect U.S. corporate and govern¬ 
mental interests through military means, the Administration 
switched to a diplomatic offensive to advance those same 
^■■^Burchett, op. cit, pp. 26, 39-45. 
11^Cox, op. cit., p. 44. 
■^^Burchett, op. cit. , page xxiii of the Introduction. 
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interests. Kissinger made an "historic" trip to Southern 
Africa in April, 1976. In a key speech in Lusaka, Zambia the 
Secretary declared that "the United States is totally dedicated 
to seeing to it that the majority becomes the ruling power in 
Rhodesia. Kissinger called for realization of majority 
rule in Zimbabwe within two years, the repeal of the Byrd 
Amendment, marginal American economic assistance to Mozambique 
to help counterbalance the hardships resulting from the closing 
of its border with Rhodesia, and a constitutional structure 
designed to protect minority rights in Zimbabwe. Under a 
so-called "transitional" government scheme hatched by Ian 
Smith and Kissinger, Caucasians (who comprised about 4 per 
cent of the total population) would have retained complete 
117 control over the armed forces and the police. ' 
Although the Secretary of State warned Rhodesia's 
minority regime that it could not expect continued American 
support in its war against the guerrillas, he said absolutely 
nothing about pressuring South Africa to accept majority rule. 
Instead, he opted for a step-by-step approach to Southern 
African dilemmas. First he would concentrate on Rhodesia, 
then Namibia, and finally South Africa. He seemed to be 
approaching the last and strongest bastion of settler dominion 
on the continent with faltering half-steps. 
^^Cox, op. cit., p. 46. 
■^^Larry Bowman, "U.S. Policy Towards Rhodesia," Chapter 4 
in American Policy in Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
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With regards to Zimbabwe and other yet-to-be-liberated 
countries in Southern Africa, Kissinger stressed the desira¬ 
bility of having what he called "moderate" African leaders 
li 3 
take the lead away from "men with guns." After "flag inde¬ 
pendence," such "moderate" leaders would no doubt form the 
core of a neo-colonial ruling class of the type described by 
Nkrumah (e.g. corrupt bureaucrats, indigenous capitalists, 
reactionary intellectuals and self-aggrandizing army/police 
officials), a class of people who perpetuate African dependency 
and underdevelopment and who are permitted to suck a small 
portion of the wealth and the surplus value from the land and 
the masses of the people only in exchange for promoting a much 
greater flow of wealth to foreign corporations and consumers. ^ 
Kissinger was certainly aware of the fact that the few African 
countries which have fiercely opposed imperialism include ones 
such as Mozambique and Angola, which achieved freedom via 
prolonged armed struggle led by militants, not moderates who 
could be easily co-opted by the West. 
Not surprisingly, Kissinger indicated that the United 
States would encourage South Africa to bring Smith into line, 
120 
but only if the liberation movements ceased fighting. Under 
the Kissinger scenario the U.S. would also help raise a fund 
of $1.5 billion to induce Caucasian settlers to remain in 
1 *j O 
Cox, op. cit., p. 46 
■^■^Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (New York: 
International Publishers, Ï97Ô), passim. See especially 
Chapter 9, "Bourgeoisie." 
120 Cox, op. cit., p. 47. 
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Zimbabwe and to foster "development" once political indepen¬ 
dence was achieved. However, the guerrillas refused to lay 
down their arms and Patriotic Front leader Robert Mugabe 
denounced the "development" fund as something designed to 
121 bind his nation politically and economically. Subsequent 
events confirmed his suspicions. A few months after Kissinger's 
whirlwind tour, representatives from Britain, South Africa and 
the U.S. met in Washington to discuss details of the fund 
(e.g. how they could use it to further capitalist penetration 
of the Zimbabwean economy). Simultaneously Assistant Secretary 
of State 'William Rogers: 
was plotting strategy with business heads from twenty 
multinational corporations (including Chase Manhattan, 
Citibank and Mobil Oil) on how to expand the flow of 
U.S. investments to Rhodesia once U.S. sanctions were 
lifted.122 
Hence, the Kissinger plan revealed an awareness that 
majority rule in Zimbabwe was inevitable; that the longer 
guerrilla warfare continued, the greater was the likelihood 
that anti-capitalist, pro-socialist leaders would come to 
power, thereby strengthening the prospects for socialist 
development throughout Southern Africa; and that the U.S. 
should resort to what Neil Leighton has aptly described as a 
policy of gradualism "in order to forestall fundamental 
changes.Ford and Kissinger never set forth a plan to 
Hakim, "The Real Stakes in Zimbabwe," op. cit., p. 27. 
122Ibid. 
^2^Leighton, "A Perspective on Fundamental Change in 
Southern Africa," Africa Today (July-September, 1976): 17* 
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bring about majority rule in South Africa itself. We will 
see that Carter's policy towards South Africa, while verbally 
emphasizing the need for majority rule and apparently offering 
real benefits to the oppressed majority, has also revolved 
around preserving the basic status quo. 
CARTER'S POLICY: HARSH REALITIES 
BEHIND THE FACADE OF POSITIVE CHANGE 
Since the early days of his Administration Jimmy 
Carter has engaged in a public relations campaign designed to 
lure U.S. citizens, Africans and the world community into 
believing that his policies towards South Africa are less 
backwards than those pursued by Nixon and Ford. U.N. Ambas¬ 
sador Andrew Young, who until his resignation v/as the "point 
man" in this stratagem, maintained that: (1) the United States 
is genuinely concerned about the human rights of South Africa's 
black majority, the 25 million people who remain disenfran¬ 
chised and bereft of any real political or economic power in 
their own homeland; and (2) that the U.S. is pressing for 
majority rule in the apartheid nation. 
Both Carter and Young have depicted U.S. multinational 
corporations as having the capacity to improve the lot of the 
African masses. Nixon and Ford never made such claims; they 
never voiced a concern for the victims of apartheid. Shortly 
before the November, 1976 election Carter confided to the 
South African Financial Mail that he would encourage U.S. 
investment in South Africa through a variety of means, including 
68 
the use of Ex-Im Bank services. He stressed that: 
Economic development, investment commitment and the use 
of economic leverage against what is, after all, a govern¬ 
ment system of repression seems to me the only way to 
achieve racial justice there.^4 
Similarly, Young argued that the American government 
wants to "see if we can't begin to evolve business ethics and 
do some of the things internationally that we made business 
do in the South [the Southern United States]" during the Civil 
12 *5 
Rights era. J Anti-apartheid activist Edgar Lockwood has 
described Young's deep faith in the capitalist system as being 
based on a "belief that it is so fundamental, so irreversible, 
so pervasive and so powerful that it amounts to a law of 
nature, whose inevitability is also conveniently beneficial." 
Young himself has stressed that "the places where I see the 
naked being clothed...where I see the sick being healed are 
127 
the places where there happens to be a free market system." 
Those words sound highly ironic to anyone familiar with the 
actual workings of the international capitalist system which, 
as we saw in Chapter I, perpetuates the lopsided division of 
global wealth between a few, affluent, industrialized nations 
and the vast majority of impoverished, underdeveloped states. 
124 
Seidmans, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corpora¬ 
te ons, op. cit., pages xviii - xix of the Introduction. 
125Ibid. 
■^2^Lockwood, "The Future of the Carter Policy Towards 
Southern Africa," in American Policy in Southern Africa, op. 
cit., p. 439• 
127lbid. 
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Carter Administration spokesmen have cited as proof 
of the progressiveness of the "new" U.S. policy towards South 
Africa the following: (1) the 197? Congressional repeal, with 
Carter’s blessings, of the Byrd Amendment (which affected the 
importation of chrome from Zimbabwe, not South Africa); 
(2) Vice President Mondale's purported "warnings" to Prime 
Minister Vorster in 1977 that South Africa's regressive racial 
policies represent the greatest opportunity for increased 
*1 Pft 
Communist bloc influence in Southern Africa; (3) Mondale's 
recommendation that South Africa should move towards full 
participation by all racial groups in its political process, 
including implementation of the "one man, one vote" formula;^9 
(4) partial implementation by some American firms of the 
Sullivan Code which, they claim, is benefiting South Africa’s 
black workers; (5) Secretary of State Vance's condemnation of 
South Africa’s bantustan policy;(6) the purported cessation 
131 of all U.S. military and police equipment sales to Pretoria; J 
and (7) Carter's withdrawal of one commercial attache and one 
■^^Richard Payne, "The Soviet-Cuban Factor in the United 
States Policy Towards Southern Africa," Africa Today (April- 
June, 1978): 24. 
■^^Winston Nagæi, "The U.S. and South Africa: the Limits 
of Peaceful Change," Chapter 5 in American Policy in Southern 
Africa, op. cit., pp. 21Ô-211. 
1^°Ibid., p. 212. In his July, 1977 speech to the NAACP 
in St. Louis Vance noted that the U.S. would not extend 
diplomatic recognition to the Transkei or Bophutatswana. 
^-^Belfiglio, op. cit., p. 66. In October, 1977 Carter 
ordered a six-month arms embargo against South Africa. In 
November the Administration announced the cutting off of 
military and police equipment sales and the withdrawal of the 
attaches. 
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naval attache from the U.S. diplomatie corps in the settler 
colony.1-^2 
One of the more detailed statements on Carter Adminis¬ 
tration policy towards South Africa was made in April, 1979 
by Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
133 Affairs. Among the themes which he emphasized were these*. 
(1) Unless South Africa moves away from apartheid and towards 
"eventual full participation by all South Africans in the 
nation's political and economic life...our relations [will] 
inevitably deteriorate." (2) The United States recognizes 
that there has been "no significant dimunition of apartheid 
in the past two years." (3) The current Administration, unlike 
its predecessors, wants to work simultaneously on solutions to 
the problems in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Progress 
in one country "will not be traded for forebearance on the 
others." (4) South Africa's efforts to thwart Namibian inde¬ 
pendence by imposing its own internal settlement would have 
"grave consequences" for the entire Southern African region. 
A fifth theme sounded by Moose was that by pushing for 
majority rule in this region of the world the United States 
hopes to diminish: 
a major source of conflict with the African and non-aligned 
nations. Relations with these nations are of growing 
^iMd. 
^^%oose, "The U.S. Role in Southern Africa," Department 
of State Bulletin, October, 1979» PP* 20-22. Except where 
otherwise indicated, all Moose quotations derive from this 
article. 
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importance to us politically as trading partners and as 
sources of natural resources. 
(6) The U.S. believes that its long-term interests "are best 
served by the emergence of leaders and governments reflecting 
the values of the Western political tradition." And (7) peace¬ 
ful resolution of conflicts would counteract "continued 
poaching in the area by outside powers which thrive on violence 
and disorder." The last two propositions are particularly 
ironic because, in reality, an integral facet of the Western 
tradition referred to so innocuously by Moose has been the 
long-standing support by the United States and other NATO 
lands of settler colonialism with all its attendant horrors 
in South Africa. It is the Caucasian minority and its allies 
(not outside agitators) which have waxed fat from the violent 
oppression of the majority population, the extraction of value 
from slave labor and the suppression of the masses' legitimate 
aspirations for self-determination. 
Within the very limited confines of liberal democratic 
analysis, some of the moves by the Carter Administration do 
seem relatively progressive when contrasted to Nixon's and 
Ford's blatant backing of the apartheid regime. But once we 
journey outside such a framework and into a frame of reference 
which exposes the capitalist system as one which has for 
centuries fueled racism, colonialism, imperialism (and, in 
^-^For a discussion of U.S. reliance on diverse Third 
World minerals, for example, see Harry Magdoff, The Age of 
Imperialism: Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, Ï969J» pp. 44-48. 
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general, the hoarding of wealth and knowledge by the few to 
the detriment of the many), then we perceive more clearly the 
severe limitations of Garter's so-called "positive" actions 
towards South Africa. The record shows that regardless of 
whether a "left wing" democrat or a "right wing" Republican 
occupies the White House, the very nature of the American 
capitalist system dictates a backwards foreign policy, one 
which serves the needs of huge corporations, colonial and 
neo-colonial elites--not the masses of people here or abroad. 
Although Carter's rhetoric against apartheid is 
stronger than any previously espoused, his actions character¬ 
istically run counter to his moralistic preachments. Neither 
Carter nor any of his representatives has ever set forth a 
specific timetable for progressive change in South Africa, or 
stated what steps the United States will take if the racist 
minority regime continues on its present course. In a 1978 
address Secretary of State Vance remarked: "South Africans of 
all races... should decide their country's future. [But] we do 
not seek to impose either a timetable or a blueprint for this 
13*5 
progress." ^ 
Under the Carter policy, U.S. firms still receive tax 
credits for their direct investments in South Africa, holdings 
^-^Although Mondale on one occasion in 1977 called for 
"one man, one vote," Cameron Hume, the South Africa desk 
officer at the State Department noted in an interview with 
the author on January 10, 1980 that this recommendation is 
"not official U.S. policy." This is just one indication of 
the vague, dubious nature of Carter's policy. See also Nagan, 
op. cit., pp. 210-211. 
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which are at an all-time high of $2 billion. Trade ties are 
also broader than ever. In 1976, for example, the two-way 
trade between the United States and South Africa amounted to 
$2.27 billion. By 1978 it had jumped by $1 billion to 
$3.27 billion.jn light of this upsurge the removal of 
a single American commercial attache from South Africa means 
virtually nothing. 
Whereas the State Department continues to mouth the 
official line that the U.S. government neither encourages nor 
discourages trade with or investment in South Africa, a 
September, 1979 "Overseas Business Report" by the Commerce 
Department adopted this distinctly partisan tone: 
The U.S. Government ban on sales of American products 
...to the South African military and police will continue 
to affect certain areas of U.S. exports. [But] as the 
stepped-up export level indicates, U.S. manufacturers and 
South African purchasers seem to be more successfully 
coping with the restrictions. Promising sales prospects 
await U.S. exporters in the areas of railway maintenance 
equipment, motor vehicle parts, lifting and loading equip¬ 
ment, mining machinery and equipment, electric motor and 
generator parts, paperboard, chemicals [etc.]. Computer 
sales are up as marketable areas have been clarified. 
South Africa's need for additional locally-produced 
energy should open up opportunities for coal mining equip¬ 
ment, power plant machinery, and sales to SA30L Ill's 
coal-to-oil plant. South Africans are evidencing a 
hightened interest in renewable energy sources. U.S. 
suppliers of solar, wind and biomass energy generating 
equipment should further explore these developments. 
Carter's de facto support of expanding commercial bonds 
^•^See Table 2 of this thesis. 
137"i^orld Trade Outlook for Africa," in Overseas Business 
Report 79-25 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
197977 P. 8. 
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with South Africa flies in the face of repeated appeals for 
the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign corporations from 
that land, appeals made by internationally respected black 
South African leaders and notable Caucasians of conscience, 
including the late Steve Biko, Chief Albert Luthuli, heads of 
the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) and the South African Council of Churches.^*^ 
These and other anti-apartheid activists have stressed that, 
far from promoting the "trickling down" of power and benefits 
to the masses, American corporations bolster the entire system 
of oppression in South Africa, including of course its mili¬ 
tary, police and security dimensions. 
Shortly before his murder Steve Biko observed: 
Heavy investments in the South African economy, bilateral 
trade with South Africa...are amongst the sins of which 
America is accused. All these activities... serve to 
entrench the position of the minority regime. America 
must therefore [drastically] re-examine her policy toward 
South Africa. 
Similarly, Oliver Tambo, President-General of the ANC stressed 
in 1978 that: 
our people are not only ready and willing to accept the 
consequences of action against the regime on the economic 
front, but they have themselves demanded the total polit¬ 
ical, economic, cultural and military isolation of the 
racist regime. We demand total isolation of the racist 
regime—no [new] investment and withdrav/al of existing 
investment 
^®For many examples see "U.S. Business in South Africa: 
Voices for Withdrawal," (New York: The Africa Fund, 1978), pp.1-6. 
139tk-^ _ o I DIG. • f Jp • 3 • 
■^°Ibid. , p. 4. 
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The Nigerian head of State, Lt. General Ousegun 
Obasanjo warned U.S. business leaders in 1977 that their 
involvement in South Africa and Rhodesia could cost them 
commerce with the West African nation. As he put it: "Inves¬ 
tors and businessmen are hard-headed calculators and I will 
leave you to choose between doing business with us or with 
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the racist regimes in Southern Africa." 
However, such advice has not deterred the Carter 
Administration from forging closer links with South Africa in 
several areas, including the crucial field of energy develop¬ 
ment . 
On April 25, 1979 the [U.3.] Department of Energy 
announced that it had obtained State Department clearance 
to offer to buy the South African Coal, Oil and Gas 
Corporation's data bank from any private corporation that 
could arrange a deal with the South African parastatal 
corporation....The data bank... consists of SASOL's 
collection of data on its fine tuning of the Fisher-- 
Tropsch, coal-to-oil process. 
In applauding this decision the Rand Daily Mail boasted: "The 
United States dramatically brushed aside scruples yesterday 
and decided to allow American firms to seek vitally needed 
143 
oil-from-coal technology from South Africa." J
Among those who lobbied for the move was U.S. Repre¬ 
sentative Moorhead of Pittsburg whose district "borders on 
large coal reserves and is also the headquarters of Allegheny 
Ludlum Steel, a corporation whose management has been an active 
l4lIbid., p. 5. 
1 h,p 
David McGloin, "Swapping Energy Know-How," Southern 
Africa, September, 1979» p. 21. 
l43Ibid. 
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proponent of continued [American] business ties with South 
Africa.” Another U.S. firm keenly interested in the deal 
is the Fluor Corporation, the main American contractor for 
the SASOL projects. 
Moreover, in 1979 the Department of Energy allowed 
two Caucasian South African engineers to participate in a 
nuclear technology training course at its Argonne National 
Laboratory near Chicago. Several black staff members at the 
Laboratory protested the engineers’ presence, observing that: 
The fact that our government... is host to citizens of a 
nation which symbolizes the negation of black people in 
particular and humanity in general is abhorrent. As 
American citizens we demand the immediate expulsion of 
these nuclear trainees, especially in the light of the 
alleged recent South African atomic explosion. 
Of course, the Carter Administration has never publicized its 
nuclear cooperation with South Africa, but it has publicly 
taken pride in the purported efforts of U.S. corporations to 
help black workers in the apartheid land by instituting labor 
reforms designed by an Afro-American, the Rev. Leon Sullivan. 
The Sullivan Principles: Weak, Reformist And Marginal 
In accaiming the Sullivan Principles, which have been 
signed by more than 120 firms since their enunciation in 1977* 
Richard Moose has stated that "the Administration strongly 
believes that American corporations operating in South Africa 
144 Ibid. 
i Ac 
' Bill Hartung, "South African Engineers at Nuclear 
Lab," Southern Africa, January, 1980, p. 12. 
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can and should act as a positive force for change through the 
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adoption of enlightened labor practices." 
On the surface, the Sullivan Code sounds good. It 
calls for: (1) non-segregation of the races in all eating, 
comfort and work facilities; (2) equal and fair employment 
practices for all employees; (3) equal pay for all employees 
doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time; 
(4) initiation and development of training programs that will 
prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites 
for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; 
(5) increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in 
management positions; and (6) improving the quality of workers' 
lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, 
transportation, schooling, health facilities and recreation. 
However, as economist Jennifer Davis emphasises, the 
Code contains no demand for any change in the fundamental 
structure of apartheid, no word about black political rights 
and no commitment to negotiating with black trade unions or 
demands for recognition of such unions by the apartheid 
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regime. Sullivan himself is a member of the General Motors 
board of directors and the central thrust of his Six Prin¬ 
ciples has ueen to effect cosmetic changes in an attempt to 
146 
Richard Moose, Statement Before the Congressional Sub¬ 
committees on Africa and International Economic Policy (Jash- 
inton, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, August, 1978), p. 3* 
^^Gail Morlan, "Sullivan Code: Cleaning Up the Corporate 
Image," Southern Africa. September, 1979» P* 1^. 
^^Jennifer Davis, "Too Little, Too Late--The U.S. Corpo¬ 
ration Employment Manifesto For South Africa," (New York: The 
Africa Fund, 1977). p. 1. 
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defuse black militancy in South Africa and anti-apartheid 
activism in the United States. As Gail Morlan observes: 
Apartheid is a tightly meshed system of total dispos¬ 
session that deprives blacks of their citizenship, freedom 
of movement, land ownership, organizing rights and educa¬ 
tion. The whole purpose of the system is to maintain the 
black population as a vast reservoir of powerless, cheap 
labor to be used when and where the bosses decide. 
The black demand for change in South Africa involves 
real political power, the destruction of the apartheid 
system, and the achievement of the right to make laws, to 
shape the economic future of the country, and to be free 
of the pass laws and security police. None of these 
things are affected by the Sullivan principles.... The 
principles allow the dollars to keep ouring in. Giant 
projects such as the new nuclear power stations aided by 
Westinghouse, and the gas-from-coal plants involving Fluor 
and Babcock and Wilcox...will strengthen the apartheid 
state’s ability to resist change. [Other] corporations 
such as General Motors and Ford [also] give direct stra¬ 
tegic assistance to the South African government by 
supplying trucks and other vehicles to the police and the 
military. 
Yet Fluor, GM and Ford have all signed the Sullivan 
principles. So, too, has Control Data, whose chairman 
commented in 1979 that "the little bit of repression that 
is added by the computer in South Africa is hardly signif¬ 
icant" compared with the good the company feels it is 
doing. Other signatories include Mobil and Caltex, which 
refine almost half of the oil used in South Africa and 
continue to sell petroleum to the government and the 
military. 
Only the dismantling of the bantustan system and the 
destruction of apartheid can meet black needs in South 
Africa. This is no job for the corporations; they want 
reforms to improve and preserve the system, not a revolu¬ 
tion which will destroy it.-j^ 
Ironically, all the U.S. businesses in South Africa 
combined provide jobs for less than 70,000 blacks out of a 
workforce of more than seven million blacksl^0 Not only is 
Sullivan Code weak; in reality, it applies to less than 
^■^Morlan, op. cit. , pp. 14-15. 
15°Ibid. , p. 15. 
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one per cent of all black laborers. And studies released in 
1979 "by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), 
the State Department and Arthur D. Little indicate that 
American firms have only half-heartedly implemented the 
Sullivan Principles. For examples 
U.S. corporations have moved at a "snail like" pace, 
according to the Financial Mai1, in raising black wages 
and hiring blacks above the unskilled and semi-skilled 
level. The U.S. State Department survey of 3D major U.S. 
corporations found no blacks at the senior management 
level. Almost all blacks remain at unskilled and semi¬ 
skilled hourly positions....GM employs only four blacks 
in salaried positions out of a workforce of 4,500. IBM 
has only four black managers out of 1,443 employees 
The IRRC found that 95 per cent of the U.S. businesses surveyed 
admitted that they paid their average black worker less than 
$238/month, which is below the minimum wage figure ($256/mcnth) 
1<2 recommended by the State Department. ^ 
As the U.S. corporate presence in South Africa has 
expanded, the overall wage gap between black and Caucasian 
workers has actually widened. "Between 197^ and 1978 black 
workers went from being paid an average of $250 a month less 
than whites doing the same job to $280 a month less. 
According to State Department official Cameron Hume, only two 
of the more than 530 American firms in the apartheid land, 
^-^Truman Dunn, "Slouching Toward Reform--U.S. Corpora¬ 
tions Under Apartheid," Southern Africa, September, 1979» 
pp. 16-17. 
152Ibid., p. 17. 
■^-^Rothmyer and Lowenthal, op. cit. , p. 4. Emphasis added. 
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1 =>4 Ford and Kellogg, have even recognized black trade unions. J 
Hence, there can be no doubt that the Carter Administration's 
depiction of U.S. corporations as promoters of progressive 
social change in South Africa amounts to a pitifully fallacious 
contention. 
The Dubious Status Of EX-IM, CCC And IMF ASSISTANCE 
Since Carter took office close to $200 million in 
loans, loan guarantees and other assistance have been funneled 
to South Africa through the Export-Import Bank, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation and the International Monetary Fund. In 
FY 1977 Ex-Im loan guarantees amounted to $115.5 million. 
That figure exceeds the average annual Ex-Im assistance during 
the Nixon years but falls short of the average during the Ford 
years. In FY 1978 Ex-Im guarantees were $45-9 million. In 
October, 1978, largely as a result of an intense campaign 
waged by the anti-apartheid movement, the U.S. Congress passed 
a bill (HR 14279) to prohibit Ex-Im guarantees and insurance 
tc the South African government and its "parastatal companies 
such as those producing steel and electricity which had 
accounted for up to a quarter of the total Ex-Im involvement 
in South Africa in recent years.However, the legislation, 
which was subsequently signed into law by the president, 
^-^Interview with Hume at the State Department, January 
10th, 1980. 
^-^See Table 5 of this thesis. 
^-^"State Department Sets Out Ex-Ira Rules," Southern 
Africa, September, 1979» P- 12. 
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contains a loophole: it allows Ex-Ira financing for South Afri¬ 
can companies which the U.S. Secretary of State has certified 
as complying with "fair employment" practices modelled after 
the Sullivan Code. So, while there were no Ex-Im flows to 
the apartheid land in 1979» there is the possibility that such 
flows could resume. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation granted South African 
businesses $4.5 million in 1977 and $8.3 million in 1978 to 
1 57 purchase American rice and soy products. In this category 
the peak figure for the Carter years is below the top figure 
for the two preceding administrations. Although there were no 
CCC grants to South Africa in 1979» no one in the Carter Admin¬ 
istration has officially revealed why this was so and it is 
not clear that the government will keep this conduit inactive 
in the future. 
In 1977 the United States contributed $25-3 million 
towards a $110 million IMF aid package to South Africa. 
The Carter Administration quietly supported this loan to the 
apartheid regime "even while castigating the white-supremacy 
government in public. Washington's time-honored tradition of 
slapping the wrist while greasing the palm was observed once 
more."'*'^ The grant was linked to a larger package which was 
^-^See Table 6 of this thesis. 
^-^Morrell and Gisselquist, op. cit., p. 1. Additional 
statistics were supplied by Morrell in an interview with the 
author in Washington, January 10, I98O. 
159 Ibid., p. 3. 
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approved during the Ford years to help South Africa grapple 
with over-spending problems triggered by its massive and 
escalating military expenditures. 
Despite reservations expressed by delegates of 
twenty-two African and European countries, the Interna¬ 
tional Monetary Fund in 1976 granted South Africa a 
record-high aid package of $366 million v/hich by December, 
1977 had increased to $464 million. This was more than 
all the rest of the countries in Africa received during 
idle same two years and was exceeded in the world only by 
loans to England and Mexico.... The objecting European and 
African delegates maintained that South Africa didn't 
really need the assistance, and, furthermore, that the 
South African government had created many of its own 
economic problems through over-spending....But the U.S. 
and British delegates to these close door meetings... spoke 
up strongly in favor of the South African request.-^Q 
Even though there were no IMF grants to South Africa 
in 1978 and 1979* government spokesmen have indicated that the 
present Administration intends to keep the IMF option open. 
State Department aide Michael Chisek observed in December, 
1978 that Carter "would not politicize the IMF under any cir¬ 
cumstances,"'''^^ while South Africa desk officer Cameron Hume 
noted in January, 198O that it is "unlikely that the with¬ 
holding of IMF grants will be used to reprimand South Africa."1^ 
Ironically, it is U.S. taxpayers (millions of them unemployed, 
all of them burdened by soaring inflation and military spending) 
who pick up the tab for all U.S. aid to South Africa. We must 
also remember that the amount of money diverted from South 
160t, . , , Ibid., p. 1. 
Telephone interview with the author, December 7» 1978. 
3-62 
Interview with Hume, op. cit. 
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Africa's coffers by the recent curtailment of Ex-I'm, CCC and 
IMF flows is miniscule compared to the huge upsurge in 
American trade with and investment in the apartheid land 
which has occurred during the Carter years. 
At the United Nations the Carter Administration has 
continued the Nixon-Ford policy of vetoing African-sponsored 
resolutions calling for a substantive economic boycott of 
South Africa. In October, 1977» for example, Ambassador Young 
vetoed a draft resolution before the Security Council calling 
for a trade embargo against the racist regime. J In the 
realm of domestic legislation the Carter team has also opposed 
progressive bills introduced by Representatives Diggs, Solarz 
and Rangel to limit U.S. investment in South Africa and to 
deny tax credits to American businesses there. 
Evidence has surfaced that U.S. Navy ships were used 
in December, 1977 and January, 1978 to ferry American manufac¬ 
tured long-range artillery shells to Antigua, where they were 
then transferred to vessels bound for South Africa. The shells 
were produced by Space Research, a company which helped South 
Africa to develop a new 153 nun howitzer.Revelations such 
1(^Burchett, op. cit., p. 275. 
^^"House Looks at Investment in South Africa," Washington 
Notes on Africa, Summer 1978, p. 8. 
^■^Bill Hartung, "Space Research Still Arming Apartheid," 
Southern Africa, November-December, 1979» PP* 15-16. This 
article draws upon diverse sources, including: the Antigua 
Workers' Union, reports in the Boston Globe and the Burlington 
Free Press of Vermont, and a tv documentary jointly produced 
by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the British Broad¬ 
casting Corporation (BBC). 
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as these make a mockery of Carter's alleged cessation of 
military sales to the apartheid regime. And while Carter's 
representatives like to point to his removal of one naval 
attache from South Africa, they never tell you about the ten 
U.S. military personnel who are still there.166 According to 
Hume, since 1977 the United States has not supplied South 
Africa with nuclear material and know-how, but negotiations 
are now underway to supply these to the regime's Koeberg 
nuclear plant. In order to clinch the deal South Africa must 
simply agree to "full-scope safeguards and continuous [monitor¬ 
ing by the U.S. of its] inventory of nuclear materials."16"'7 
Drawing upon America's Civil Rights experience, the 
Carter Administration is also helping South Africa to forge 
a black middle class as an insurance against rebellion. The 
U.S. government’s International Communications Agency, headed 
by black foreign service officer John Reinhardt, has been 
carefully selecting black South African students, social 
workers, labor leaders and intellectuals for education in the 
United States. In 1979 the ICA sent a multi-racial team to 
Witwatersrand University "to help construct an affirmative 
action program with open admissions and compensatory education 
in all fields."168 
16 Edgar Lockwood, executive director of the Washington 
Office On Africa, a leading anti-apartheid lobbying organiza¬ 
tion, noted this in an interview in Washington, January 11, 1980. 
l6^Interview with Hume, op. cit. 
1 68 
"U.S. Agency Seeks Influence in Africa," Southern 
Africa, October, 1979i p. 14. 
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Ventures such as these are designed to mesh with South 
Africa’s specific plans to mold its African bourgeoisie along 
certain lines. Following the Soweto uprisings, the Transvaal 
Chamber of Industries recommended that the Vorster government 
develop a black middle class with: 
Western-type materialistic needs and ambitions [because] 
only by having this most responsible section of the urban 
black population on our side can the whites of South 
Africa be assured of containing on a long-term basis the 
irresponsible economic and political ambitions of those 
blacks who are influenced against their own real interests 
from within and without our borders. [According to Anton 
Rupert, an Afrikaner financier and tobacco magnate,] "a 
prerequisite of achieving our over-all objectives should 
be the adoption of free enterprise values by urban 
blacks." To pursue these goals, Rupert and Harry Oppen¬ 
heimer, chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, 
founded the Urban Foundation [allegedly] to promote commu¬ 
nity development and improve township conditions 
The above strategy, as adapted by Prime Minister Botha, entails 
granting black workers permission to form weak, hamstrung 
"trade unions" and allowing a few blacks to take up permanent 
and relatively privileged residence in urban areas even as 
millions of their brothers and sisters are restricted to bantu- 
stan reservations. 
169 Magubane, op. cit., p. 148. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD TO ARMAGEDDON 
As the most industrialized nation in Africa, the 
supplier of precious minerals to the West and the locus of 
huge investments by NATO lands, South Africa enjoys a unique 
sub-imperial status which has enabled it to drain immeasurable 
wealth from the earth and subject peoples throughout Southern 
Africa. The American ruling class is keenly aware that the 
triumph of armed struggle in South Africa and the evolution 
there of a socialist political economy would threaten Western 
interests not only in the Southern region but throughout the 
entire continent. The advent of socialism and Pan-Africanism 
in South Africa could transform it into a formidable base for 
attacking neo-colonialism elsewhere in Africa. A liberated 
South Africa could utilize its abundant natural resources, 
highly developed economy and awesome military might to advance 
demands of Third world nations for a just international eco¬ 
nomic order. Such developments would dramatically shift the 
world balance of power in favor of the "have not" nations at 
a time when U.S. imperialism is losing ground in other key 
countries such as Zimbabwe, Iran and Nicaragua. 
The South African policies of Nixon and Carter differ 
in style, not in essence: both revolve around the goal of 
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8? 
perpetuating capitalism and imperialism in one of the globe's 
most strategic regions. The Nixon Administration openly- 
promoted commercial, political and military links with the 
apartheid state, while contemptuously denying the possibility 
of black majority rule materializing in Southern Africa. It 
massively supported the Caucasian minority regimes in Rhodesia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. But the collapse 
of the Portuguese African empire and the triumph of guerrillas 
dedicated to building socialist regimes shattered the Nixon 
rationale. Kissinger and Ford accepted the inevitability of 
majority rule in Southern Africa. They committed the United 
States government to doing everything possible to guarantee 
that the transition to majority rule would occur within a 
framework designed to preserve the pro-Western, pro-capitalist 
tradition of the region. 
The Carter Administration, unlike that of Nixon, has 
denounced apartheid, advocated majority rule in South Africa 
and curtailed Ex-Im, IMF and CCC flows to the settler colony. 
The Administration has also warned that the failure to grant 
blacks political and economic rights would jeopardize relations 
between the U.S. and South Africa. Simultaneously, it has 
permitted the broadening of commercial ties between the two 
nations, allowed American weaponry to reach South Africa, and 
urged the minority regime's rulers to incorporate a small 
percentage of blacks into middle class niches in order to 
safeguard the long-range interests of capital. On balance, 
Nixon emerges as an "honest” defender of racism and capitalism 
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in South Africa whereas Carter emerges as a superficially 
pious figure who rhetorically takes the side of the oppressed 
even as he substantively aids the oppressors. 
In championing the continued U.S. corporate presence 
in the apartheid land, Carter has maintained that the firms 
can weaken apartheid and uplift blacks. Aside from the gross 
fallacies in this argument already examined in Chapter III, 
it is noteworthy that South African officials themselves nave 
renounced Carter's logic. Donald Sole, the pariah state's 
ambassador to the United States, has bluntly remarked: 
I do not think they [the corporations] will play any role 
in the elimination of apartheid... They cannot play any 
role whatsoever in the institution of black majority 
rule..• 
And while Prime Minister Botha has warned right-wing nation¬ 
alists that they must "adapt or die in a bloodbath before 
breakfast," he has stressed that his modifications are designed 
to perpetuate Caucasian, capitalist domination, not to grant 
171 
genuine economic or political rights to blacks. 1 In 
November, 1979 Botha told leaders of the Colored community 
that South Africa would "never see one-man, one-vote elec¬ 
tions . •,1?2 
Those American businessmen and scholars who have 
■^^Quoted in "U.S. Business in South Africa: Voices for 
Withdrawal," op. cit., p. 1. Emphasis in the original. 
^^Africa News, Durham, North Carolina, October 5» 1979» 
p. 5. 
^2"Botha Rules Out 'One Man, One Vote' Forever," New 
York Times, November 11, 1979. sect. 1, p. 8. 
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defended the Carter Administration's pro-corporate gambits 
have been unable to muster anything beyond specious rationali¬ 
zations. The preceding chapter exposed the superficiality of 
the Sullivan Code. Equally bogus in the contention by Fortune 
magazine that the withdrawal of American corporations from 
South Africa would be ineffective unless it was accompanied 
by a European boycott, which, in turn, seems unlikely because 
of the much greater British stake in South Africa.This 
argument is akin to a thief justifying continued plunder by 
saying: "If I don't rob these people, my friends certainly 
will." 
Like his predecessors, Carter has assumed that what 
is good for huge businesses is, by definition, beneficial to 
the masses of Americans. On the contrary, as the Seidmans 
accurately note: 
The transformation of the capitalist world's produc¬ 
tion structure, reflected by U.S. multinational involve¬ 
ment in Southern Africa, has direct [and negative] 
implications for the people of the United States. The 
increased capital intensity and automation of basic 
industries in the industrial center and the transfer of 
more labor-intensive production overseas by U.S. based 
multinationals has contributed to higher rates of unemploy¬ 
ment in the U.S. itself.... The same U.S. banks that are 
expanding loans overseas, often to South Africa, are 
forcing state and city governments in the U.S. to agree to 
cut back on jobs, welfare programs and essential services 
like schools and hospitals 
^■^Herman Nickel, "The Case for Doing Business in South 
Africa," Fortune, June 19, 1978, p. 63. See also Magubane, 
op. cit., p. 211 where he notes that "at the end of 1973 the 
EEC [European Economic Community] accounted for about two- 
thirds of total foreign investment in South Africa." 
i 74 
' Soutn Africa and U.S, Multinational Corporations, op. 
cit., page xxi of the Introduction. 
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By subsidizing the South African ruling class, Carter 
is unwittingly increasing the prospects for Armageddon. His 
policy leaves African liberation movements no choice but to 
wage armed struggle and to increase their reliance on the 
Soviets, the Chinese and other anti-capitalist nations. In 
South Africa itself contradictions and pressures are steadily 
mounting. Economists have stressed the explosive implications 
of the presence of two million unemployed black South Afri- 
17 < 
cans. "Militancy is rising. There are walkouts in the 
mines, wildcat strikes in factories, black boycotts against 
ry Z 
rent hikes and higher bus fares." ' Sporadic guerrilla 
attacks on police stations have increased since the liberation 
of Zimbabwe. If full scale warfare erupts in the near future, 
it will only be the logical outcome of centuries of oppression. 
As in the cases of Vietnam, Chile and Iran, the 
American people may find themselves sinking deeper and deeper 
into another foreign policy nightmare wherein they pay an 
increasingly higher price (e.g. the growing alienation of 
millions of people, the possible cutoff of resources to the 
U.S. by a future regime) for a backwards governmental policy 
which upholds a brutal, obsolete social system while making 
hollow promises to the enslaved masses. 
Given the dismal character of America's South African 
policy, what steps would the Carter Administration have to 
■^•^Jennifer Davis, "U.S. Dollars in South Africa," op. 
ext., p. è. 
176U.S. News & World Report, October 15, 1979, PP- 81-82. 
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take in order to prove its professed intention to promote 
majority rule and the cause of human dignity? African nation¬ 
alists and other anti-apartheid activists have recommended 
that the Administration: (1) suspend all tax credits to U.S. 
firms in South Africa; (2) declare as formal policy the cessa¬ 
tion of all Sx-Im, CCC and IMF flows to the apartheid land; 
(3) cease all military transactions and nuclear cooperation; 
(4) strongly discourage the travelling of some 50,000 U.S. 
tourists per year* to South Africa; (5) prohibit loans by U.S. 
banks to the South African government and private companies; 
(6) institute a broad economic boycott; and (7) sever diplo- 
177 matic relations, 11 Full-fledged economic and political 
relations would not be restored until South Africa adopts 
majority rule. 
However, given the low level of consciousness in the 
United States, there is no doubt that only the mobilization 
and education of masses of Americans could conceivably generate 
the pressure necessary to force the government to implement 
such progressive measures. Without the formation of large 
scale, politically sophisticated, anti-apartheid, anti-capital¬ 
ist constituencies across the U.S., we can expect the continu¬ 
ation of the unholy alliance between Washington and Pretoria. 
Nevertheless, should the calcified attitudes of 
apartheid decision makers and their grisly oppression of South 
■^^Clyde Ferguson and William Cotter, ‘'South Africa: What 
Is To Be Done?" Foreign Affairs (January, 1978): 269-274. 
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African blacks lead to a viable resistance movement and 
widespread armed struggle, the U.S. governmental elite, 
working closely with the business elite, might consider lessen¬ 
ing assistance to Pretoria. It is possible that the United 
States would abandon the most intransigent Afrikaners and 
press for a moderate, pro-Western, pro-capitalist, black-ruled 
regime if it becomes evident that the Caucasian rulers can no 
longer sustain basic societal controls, controls which are 
essential for the protection of long-term U.S. economic and 
political interests in South Africa. 
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